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This article has three purposes. First, the significant changes in
the civil commitment law are identified and their implications explored.
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INTRODUCTION

Minnesota law governing commitments has been substantially
revised and recodified in the Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982. I
The prior law2 is repealed and the new law is substituted for it effective August 1, 1982.3
The Act is the result of a gradual reform process designed to
strengthen the due process accorded those subject to commitment
procedures. Many of the revisions are foreshadowed in existing
consent decrees. In Vickerman v. Hennepin County Probate Court,4
detailed changes in the judicial procedures leading to commitment
were implemented. InAnderson v. Likins,s and Flick v. Noot,6 procedures were established governing the revocation of provisional
discharges for those committed as mentally ill and mentally retarded respectively.
Many of the changes accomplished by the Act can be traced to
recommendations in the Report of the Supreme Court Study Commission on the Mentally Disabled and the Courts. 7 The report conI. MINN. STAT. §§ 2538.01-.23 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Act).
2. MINN. STAT. §§ 253A.01-.23 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
3. Proceedings initiated before August I, 1982 are governed by the old law. Proceedings initiated under the prior law and not terminated by August I, 1983 are then governed
by the new law. Finally, anyone indeterminately committed under prior law is subject to the
determinate commitment review provisions in the new law not later than February I, 1984.
/d.
4. No. 4-78 Civil 376 (D. Minn. 1980).
5. No. 4-72 Civil 422 (D. Minn. 1974).
6. No. 4-78 Civil 359·(D. Minn. 1979).
7. Civil Commitment in Minnesota, Final Report of the Supreme Court Study Commission on the Mentally Disabled and the Courts (1979). [hereinafter cited as Final Report.)
The Study was initiated in 1977 to determine whether the courts and other institutions of the
state were adequately meeting the needs of the mentally disabled and whether court procedures were fair, appropriate, and uniform throughout the state. Among the members of the
Commission were six psychiatrists, fourteen attorneys, seven institutional officials, representatives of several concerned organizations, public officials, advocates, psychologists, a journalist and a psychiatric nurse. Id. at ii. The primary emphasis of the Study was on the
operation of the Minnesota Hospitalization and Commitment Act [MINN. STAT. §§ 253A.Ol.23 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982»). The Study resulted in 24 Recommendations by the
Commission.
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tained twenty-four separate recommendations, the great majority
concerned the civil commitment process and provided the major impetus for the Act. 8 Subsequent to the report's publication, the Minnesota Supreme Court appointed a commission to implement the
recommendations, to the extent possible, by court rule. The result
of the Commission's work was the Special Rules of Procedure Governing Proceedings Under the Minnesota Commitment Act of
1982.9
This article has three purposes. First, the significant changes in
the civil commitment law are identified and their implications explored. Second, where appropriate, the legal background underlying the changes is explored in order to place the changes in context.
Third, the article identifies ambiguities and inconsistencies in the
Act, posits resolutions, and suggests areas for legislative attention.
I.

DISABILITY CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS

Many of the significant policy changes incorporated in the Act
are in the definitions section.1O The more important of these
changes have been made in defining the disability categories, the
official persons involved in the commitment process and the treatment facilities.
Each of the definitions of the four disability categories is significantly changed by the Act. In addition to making substantive
changes, the amendments simplify the definitions by avoiding confusing cross-references to the operative portion of the Act.
Chemically Dependent Person

The term "chemically dependent person" replaces the term "inebriate person."" The Act retains the bulk ofthe old definition, but
expands it in an effort to add precision. The old law simply required finding the person was "incapable of managing himself or his
affairs by reason of the habitual and excessive use of liquor, narcotics or other drugs."'2
The Act adds to this rather vague criterion a requirement that
8. Final Report, supra note 7 at, 61-86.
9. Special Rules of Procedure Governing Proceedings Under Minnesota Commitment
Act of 1982.
10. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (1982).
II. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 2 (1982) replaces MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 4
(1980) (repealed August I, 1982) which defined "inebriate persons."
12. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 4 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
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the person's use of chemicals or drugs poses a "substantial likelihood of physical harm" to self or others as a result of the chemical
abuse. In adding the requirement of a demonstrated likelihood of
harm, the Act extends to chemically dependent persons the same
sort of definitional protections previously provided to persons alleged to be mentally ill under the old law. Further, the type of evidence which may be used to demonstrate the likelihood of harm is
specified. Admissible evidence includes: "(i) a recent attempt or
threat to do physical harm; (ii) evidence of recent serious physical
problems; (iii) a failure to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter
or medical care for himself." 13 The idea of physical harm is central
to the new definition. Harm which does not amount to physical
harm would be insufficient to support a commitment. Examples of
harm which would not be sufficient to support a commitment include harm to the family structure of the chemically dependent person; harm to the financial estate of the person through waste or
mismanagement of assets; "self-destructive" behavior such as missing work or other obligations; or emotional harm to family and
friends.
Mentally III Person

The new definition of "mentally ill person" modifies and tightens the requirement that some harm be shown in order to commit. 14
It also makes significant changes in the "non-behavioral" aspect of
the definition, which specifies the type of mental disability which
must be demonstrated in order to commit.
The old law contained a broad definition of "mentally ill person" which provided few interpretive guideposts. The definition included any person diagnosed as having a "psychiatric or other
disorder which substantially impairs his mental health. . . ."15 The
Act tightens this definition substantially. The pertinent part of the
new definition reads, "a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought,
mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or
understand. . . ."16
A full exploration of the implications of the new definition of
"mentally ill persons" is beyond the scope of this article, and must
13. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 2 (1982).
14. Id., subd. 13.
IS. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 3 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
16. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 13 (1982).
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await authoritative judicial construction. However, a number of
points and practical comments about the definition can be made.
The new definition contains many terms which carry some meaning
outside of the context of the Act. It must be assumed that each of
these terms is intended to have some operative effect, that is, including certain disorders and excluding others from the definition of
mentally ill person.
The definition of mentally ill person might be divided into
seven elements. 17 The individual must have a disorder which is psychiatric. 18 As noted above, the old definition referred to "psychiatric or other disorders." The legislature must have intended some
change in meaning by the omission of the word "other."19 The disorder must be of one or more of the following: thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory. These are terms of art for
psychologists and psychiatrists. 2o Careful attention should be paid
to the technical definitions of these terms in determining whether a
certain disorder falls within the legal definition of "mentally ill
person."21
The disorder must be "substantial" and impair judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or understand. Finally the impairment must be "gross". The use of the terms
"substantial" and "gross" is significant. In close cases, practitioners
17. (I) A disorder, (2) which is psychiatric, (3) of one of enumerated types, (4) which
is substantial in character, (5) and grossly, (6) impairs, (7) judgment, behavior, capacity to
recognize reality, or to reason or understand.
18. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM III). The definition of
"mental disorder" given there emphasizes that there must be a "behavioral psychologic, or
biologic disfunction" and that the disturbance not be "limited to a conflict between an individual and society . . . . " Id. at 363.
19. See Johnson v. Noot, 323 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1982) in which the Minnesota
Supreme Court discussed the application of the old definition to character disorders. The
court's language suggests that "character disorders" did not fall within the term "traditional
psychiatric disorders":
[W)e hold that a character disorder substantially impairs mental health and therefore constitutes mental illness [under prior law] only when the disorder takes away
the person's ability to control his conduct. Only at that point. . . does the character disorder's effect on mental health reach the degree of impairment caused by
traditional psychiatric disorders.
Id. at 727.
20. For example, "mood" is defined as "[a] persuasive and sustained emotion that in the
extreme, markedly colors the person's perception of the world. Mood is to affect as climate
is to weather. Common examples of mood 'include depression, elation, anger, and anxiety."
DSM III, supra note 20, at 363. "Orientation" is defined as "[a]wareness of where one is in
relation to time, place, and person." Id. at 365.
21. For example, antisocial personality.
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should insist upon explication of the examiner's standards in order
to determine whether or not the impairment is "substantial" or
"gross" .
Although it is premature to attempt a definitive comment on
the new definition, it appears to these authors that the legislature
intended for the most part to eliminate personality or character disorders22 from the definition. This reading would be consistent with
22. "Personality disorder" is defined as:
Deeply ingrained patterns of behavior, which include the way one relates to, receives, and thinks about the environment and oneself. Personality traits are prominent aspects of personality, and do not imply pathology. Personality disorder
implies inflexible and maladaptive patterns of sufficient severity to cause either
significant impairment in adaptive functioning or subjective distress.
DSM III, supra note 20, at 366 (emphasis in original).
Indeed it is arguable that the definition includes only psychoses. Thus the definition of
"mentally ill person" at MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 12 (1982), is strikingly similar to the
definition of "psychotic" in DSM III, supra note 20, at 367-68:
PSYCHOTIC. A term indicating gross impairment in reality testing. It may
be used to describe the behavior of an individual at a given time, or a mental
disorder in which at some time during its course all individuals with the disorder
have grossly impaired reality testing. When there is gross impairment in reality
testing, the individual incorrectly evaluates the accuracy of his or her perceptions
and thoughts and makes incorrect inferences about external reality, even in the
face of contrary evidence. The term psychotic does not apply to minor distortions
of reality that involve matters of relative judgment. For example, a depressed person who underestimated his achievements would not be described as psychotic,
whereas one who believed he had caused a natural catastrophe would be so described.
Direct evidence of psychotic behavior is the presence of either delusions or
hallucinations without insight into their pathological nature. The term psychotic is
sometimes appropriate when an individual's behavior is so grossly disorganized
that a reasonable inference can be drawn that reality testing is disturbed. Examples included markedly incoherent speech without apparent awareness by the person that the speech is not understandable, and the agitated, inatttentive, and
disoriented behavior seen in Alcohol Withdrawal Delirium.
The term psychotic was applied to individuals whose "mental functions [were]
sufficiently impaired to interfere grossly with their capacity to meet the ordinary
demands of life," whether or not there was impaired reality testing. AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968). This definition of psychotic did not conform to common
usage, which generally limited the use of the term to impairment in reality testing,
as does the DSM III definition. As a result, the value of the term for communication was diminished, since it was then unclear whether or not an individual described as being psychotic had gross impairment in reality testing. It should also
be noted that an individual with a nonpsychotic mental disorder may exhibit
psychotic behavior, though rarely. For example, an individual with Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder may at times come to believe in the reality of the danger of
being contaminated by shaking hands with strangers.
In DSM III the psychotic disorders include Pervasive Developmental Disorders, Schizophrenic and Paranoid Disorders, Psychotic Disorders Not Elsewhere Classified, some Organic Mental Disorders, and some Affective Disorders.
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the Minnesota Supreme Court's recent holding in Johnson v. Noot,23
that character disorders are not included under the old law except
where the disorder takes away the person's ability to control his conduct. However, individual evaluations might show that some people
with character disorders still fit the definition. Nevertheless, the
main thrust of the new definition seems to be toward including only
traditional "psychiatric" disorders.2 4 To the extent others pose danger to society through violent behavior which violates the criminal
law, they are more properly dealt with in the criminal justice system.
Traditional psychiatric hospitals are generally not equipped to deal
with people whose danger to society stems from a personality disorder. Society is less likely to think of these individuals as "ill", and
more likely to think of them as "bad." Additionally, as opposed to
those with psychotic illnesses, persons with personality disorders do
not exhibit the lack of orientation and impaired perceptual system
which often leads to a sense of reduced legal and social
responsibility.
The definition of mentally ill person continues in two additional segments. The first requires that the psychiatric disorder be
"manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions."25 This requirement is added to insure that only those disorders which have had some impact on the person's interaction with
the outside world are included. For example, the report of the
Supreme Court Study Commission26 emphasized the need to support petitions for commitment with "factual statements in behavioral terms."
Finally, the definition requires a "substantial likelihood of
physical harm" to self or others. As with the definition of chemically dependent person,27 this definition specifies that the types of
23. 323 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1982).
24. Note that in DSM III personality disorders are catalogued on Axis II, separately
from the more Florid Axis I disorders. See also Bursten, What If Antisocial Personality Is
An Illness, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 97 (1982).
25. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 13 (1982).
26. Final Report, supra note 7, at 79. Recommendation 15 provides:
The petition should contain factual descriptions of the proposed patient's recent
behavior, where it occurred, and over what period of time it occurred. Each factual allegation should be supported by observations of witnesses who are named in
the petition. Petitions should contain factual statements in behavioral terms and
should not contain judgmental or conclusory statements.
Id.
27. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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behavioral evidence which must be used to demonstrate likelihood
of harm are:
(i) A recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others;
(ii) A failure to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care for himself, as a result of the impairment. 28

The first behavioral element changes the old law in three ways.
First, it requires that the attempt or threat be recent. Second, the old
law did not include threats to harm others. 29 Finally, the old law
required a demonstrated threat or attempt to cause serious physical
harm, while the new law makes no mention of the degree of harm
required.
The second behavioral element varies from the old law in two
ways. The new law omits failure to protect oneself from exploitation.30 To the extent that the exploitation causes physical harm or
deprives the person of necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical
care, it would still be covered by the definition. If the exploitation
does not rise to that level, guardianship, conservatorship or other
forms of protective services might still be available. 31 The old law
also referred to failure to "care for his own needs for food, clothing,
shelter, safety or medical care".32 The new law omits "safety", and
makes clear that only failure to provide "necessary" services is
grounds for commitment. It would, of course, be impermissible
bootstrapping to include failure to obtain psychiatric care within the
definition of "medical care."33
28. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 13 (1982).
29. Under the old law, a threat of suicide was sufficient to satisfy this behavioral element. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 17(a) (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
30. Under the old law, this behavioral element could be satisfied by a showing that the
proposed patient "failed to protect himselffrom exploitation from others." Id. At times this
provision was interpreted to include exploition that was strictly material and posed no threat
of physical harm to the proposed patient.
31. Under MINN. STAT. § 525.54 subd. 3 (1982) a guardian or conservator of the estate
may be appointed for a person "who is impaired to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his estate or
financial affairs . . . . ." Social Security and welfare benefits can often be protected from
dissipation through exploitation by means of a "protective" or representative payee. For
example, 20 C.F.R. § 404. 2001 (1981) provides:
When it appears to the [Social Security] Administration that the interest of a beneficiary entitled to a payment ... would be served thereby, certification of payment
may be made by the Administration, regardless of the legal competency or incompetency of the beneficiary entitled thereto, either for direct payment to such beneficiary, or for his use and benefit to a relative or some other person and the
'representative payee' of the beneficiary.
32. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 17 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
33. The whole purpose of the Act is to determine which persons are to be required to
undergo involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. The universe from which these persons are
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Mentally Retarded Person
The Act adopts the term "mentally retarded person" in place of
"mentally deficient person."34 The new definition retains the core of
the old, stating "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning existing concurrently with demonstrated deficits in adaptive behavior. . . ."35 Following the pattern set by the mental illness
definition, the drafters have limited the definition of mentally retarded persons to those who "pose a substantial likelihood of physical harm" to self or others. As with the other two disability
categories, the types of behavioral evidence which can be used to
demonstrate the likelihood of harm are set OUt. 36
In a change from the old law, the new definition of "mentally
retarded person" omits failure to protect against exploitation as a
ground for commitment. 37 The drafters evidently felt that remedies
less drastic than commitment could respond to exploitation which
did not produce any danger of physical harm.38 With respect to
physical harm to self or others, the old definition included only attempts to do serious harm, and was not limited to recent attempts. 39

Person MenIally 111 and Dangerous
In framing the new definition of "person mentally ill and dangerous to the public, "40 the Act sharpens the distinction between this
category and the definition of mentally ill person. 41 The definition is
in two major parts. First, it includes only those persons who are
designated is, of course, the class of persons who refuse psychiatric care. If such refusal is, in
and of itself, sufficient to satisfy the behavioral element of the statute, then there would be
no role for the other behavioral elements. This follows from the fact that all of those for
whom involuntary commitment is appropriate must, by definition, have refused appropriate
psychiatric care, thus making the other behavioral elements superfluous.
34. MINN STAT. § 2538.02 subd 14 (1982).
35. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 5 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
36. These are basically the same behavioral elements as apply to the definition of mentally ill persons, (i) a recent threat or attempt to physically harm self or others, or (ii) a
"failure and inability to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, safety, or medical care."
See supra text accompanying note 28.
37. Compare with the definition of "mentally ill" persons, supra note 17.
38. For example, under the Mental Retardation Protection Act, the Commissioner of
Public Welfare can be appointed guardian or conservator of a mentally retarded person "in
need of the supervision and protection of a conservator or guardian." MINN. STAT. § 252A
subd. \0 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982). No showing of physical harm is necessary for
such an appointment to be appropriate.
39. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 5 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
40. Hereinafter referred to as M.I. & D.
41. MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 17 (1982). See supra notes 16-35.
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"mentally ill."42 This represents a clarification of the old law, which
included mentally deficient persons, as well as those found to be
mentally il1. 43 Second, the definition requires a finding that the person "as a result of that mental illness presents a clear danger to the
safety of others. . . . "44 This must be demonstrated by two facts.
First, that there has been an "overt act causing or attempting to
cause serious physical harm to another;" and second, that there is a
"substantial likelihood that the person will engage in acts capable of
inflicting serious physical harm on another."45
The phrase "as a result of that mental illness," is a change from
the old language. It is intended to limit the application of the mentally ill and dangerous (MI&D) label to those whose dangerousness
is caused by their mental illness.
This definition, in contrast to those for the other disability categories, refers to "serious" physical harm. Mere threats of harm
would be insufficient to satisfy the definition, although there is no
requirement that the person have succeeded in his attempts to inflict
serious harm. Threats, of course, might be relevant in satisfying the
second part of the "danger" definition, the prediction of future
harm. However, in order to satisfy that part of the definition, it is
insufficient to show merely that the person is likely to attempt to
harm another. It must be shown that the attempt will be "capable"
of inflicting serious harm. This, presumably, would require a showing that the person has both the intent and the means to inflict harm.
Examiner

The Act defines "examiner" as "a licensed physician or a licensed consulting psychologist, knowledgeable, trained and practicing in the diagnosis and treatment of the alleged impairment."46 The
definition of "examiner" contains a number of significant changes.
Under the old law, psychologists could be used as examiners only
where a licensed physician "especially qualified in the diagnosis of
mental illness" was unavailable. 47 Under the new law, a licensed
consulting psychologist may be used without any such restriction.
In addition, any examiner whether physician or psychologist, must
42. Id., subd. 17.
43. MINN. STAT. § 252A.02 subd. 17 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
44. MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 17 (1982).
45. Id.
46. MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 7 (1982).
47. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 6 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
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be qualified in the particular disability area involved. Psychiatrists
may not fit that definition with respect to chemical dependency and
mental retardation. Of particular import is the requirement that the
examiner actually be practicing in the diagnosis and treatment of
the alleged impairment. This could eliminate the "professional witness" from eligibility to serve as an examiner.
Note that the term "examiner" has a much broader application
in the Act than it did under the old law. The term formerly referred
solely to persons who were appointed by the court to examine the
proposed patient prior to commitment. Now the term is used in a
number of other contexts. 48 The use of the term in these contexts
should not be understood as requiring the court to appoint the same
"examiners" it appoints to undertake the statutory examination.
Rather, the use of the term indicates that the statements supporting
emergency holds and petitions must be made by persons - either
physiCians or licensed consulting psychologists - knowledgeable,
trained and practicing in the field involved.
Health Officer

The Act makes two changes in the definition of "health officer".49 In addition to changing the archaic "certified consulting
psychologist" to "licensed consulting psychologist", it adds "formally designated members of a pre-petition screening unit established by § 253B.07." Health officers have the power to take a
person into custody pursuant to the provision for emergency holds. 50
Since the Act provides no guidelines at all as to who may be a member of the pre-petition screening unit, this change in the Act significantly broadens the class of persons who may use the health officer's
hold. 51
48. For example, an emergency hold requires a statement of an examiner. MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.05 subd. 1 (1982). Any petition for judicial commitment must be accompanied by a
statement from an examiner to the effect that he has recently examined the subject and
believes that commitment is appropriate. MINN STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 2 (1982).
49. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 16 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982) provided that a
"health officer" was "a licensed physician, certified consulting psychologist, psychiatric social worker, or psychiatric or public health nurse."
50. MINN. STAT. § 253B.05 subd. 2 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 107-123.
51. The "pre-petition screening unit" is appointed by the designated agency to conduct
an investigation to determine whether commitment is appropriate. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07
subd. 1 (1982).
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Treatment Facility
The Act makes one final important definitional change. The
definition of the new term "treatment facility" closely parallels the
definition of "hospital" in the old law. 52 "Treatment facility" means
a "hospital, community mental health center, or other institution
qualified to provide care, and treatment for mentally ill, mentally
retarded, or chemically dependent persons."53 The change in name
was made to emphasize the Act's mandate that commitment be to
the least restrictive appropriate setting, which might not be a
hospital. 54
II.

PATIENTS' RIGHTS

The Act collects in one section a number of provisions of the
old law. 55 While many of the changes are not of major significance,
there are a few changes of policy that must be considered.
Correspondence Rights
Correspondence rights may be restricted only where the "medical welfare" of the patient requires it. 56 Otherwise, patients may
"correspond freely without censorship." Visitation with personal
physicians, spiritual advisors and counsel must be permitted at all
reasonable times. 57
Consent
In the section dealing with consent for medical procedures,58·
the Act changes the emphasis of the old law, with no major change
in meaning. 59 As before, consent is required prior to surgical operations. Under the old law, the consent of the patient was required
only when the head of the hospital determined that he had "sufficient capacity to make a responsible decision."60 In other cases,
52. MINN. STAT. § 253A.02 subd. 8 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982) defined "hospital"
as: "a public or private hospital, community mental health center, or other institution or
part thereof equipped to provide care and treatment for mentally ill, mentally deficient, or
inebriate persons."
53. MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 19 (1982).
54. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.09 subd. I (1982).
55. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 (1982).
56. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd. 2 (1982).
57. Id., subd. 3.
58. Id., subd. 6.
59. MINN. STAT. § 253A.17 subd. 8 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
60. Id.
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"substitute" consent from a guardian, relative, or head of hospital,
was sufficient. The new law changes the implicit presumption of
incapacity. Under the new law, consent is required from adult patients unless the patient is subject to guardianship or conservatorship, the head of the facility determines that the patient is not
competent to consent, or there is an emergency.61
Consent to both surgical and medical procedures is now required; formerly the consent requirement specifically applied only
to surgery. But the Act excludes treatment for mental illness,
mental retardation or chemical dependency from the broad requirement for prior consent. This exclusion represents the Legislature's
reluctance to deal with the thorny problem of involuntary treatment
for committed persons. 62 The new language apparently leaves the
law where it stood with regard to such treatment. There is no statutory law regulating the involuntary treatment of committed persons.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has articulated the constitutionally
required standards governing involuntary "intrusive" treatment,
such as electroshock therapy.63 By excluding the treatment of
mental illness, mental retardation and chemical dependency from
the consent section, the legislature has said nothing affirmative
about the subject. The section does not say that such treatment may
be carried on without prior consent. Rather, it simply excludes such
treatment from the statutory requirement of prior consent. Other
sources of law - such as the Constitution or administrative rules
and regulations - may well impose consent requirements. 64 In ad61. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 subd. 6 (1982).
62. The issue of involuntary treatment entails a number of difficult questions. First, to
what extent is "consent" a requirement for treatment of committed persons? To the extent
that it is a requirement, who is competent (legally) to give consent? Does commitment ipso
faCIO render the patient incompetent to give or withhold consent? If not, how does one
judge such competence? If the patient is incompetent, who can give "substitute" consent?
Are there limitations on the types of treatment for which substitute consent is adequate, or
the circumstances under which it can (or must) be exercised? Can the state force treatment
without obtaining consent, either direct or substitute? If so, under what circumstances? Is
involuntary institutionalization so inherently coercive as to make truly voluntary consent a
fiction?
63. Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976) (once action is justified by
compelling state interest, the least restrictive means must be used). See also Rogers v. Okin,
478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), ajJ'd in parI, rev'd in parI, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),
vacaled and remanded sub. nom., Mills v. Rodgers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
64. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), o/f'd in parI, rev'd in
parI, 654 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacaled and remanded sub. nom., Mills v. Rodgers, 102 S.
Ct. 2442 (1982); Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
The Minnesota Department of Public Welfare has a written policy governing the involuntary administration of major tranquilizers in State hospitals. Minnesota Department of
Public Welfare, Institutions Manual, Part XII (1981). The Policy allows for involuntary
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dition, the legislature recently instructed the Department of Public
Welfare to promulgate rules governing the imposition of "aversive
and deprivation" procedures on mentally retarded persons. 65 If the
rules follow the pattern of previously proposed rules on the same
subject,66 they will certainly contain extensive requirements regarding prior informed consent for such treatment procedures.
Right to Treatment
The new Act repeats verbatim, the language of old law enunciating the "[R]ight to receive proper care and treatment, best
.adapted, according to contemporary professional standards, to rendering further custody, institutionalization, or other services unnecessary'."67 This right takes on new significance however, because it is
now tied to the commitment determination made by the court. The
Act provides that if commitment is warranted, it shall be to the
"least restrictive treatment facility which can meet the patient's
treatment needs consistent with" the right to treatment section. 68
The right to treatment section, 69taken in conjunction with the commitment section, should have a substantial impact. It should prevent "dumping" of committed patients into community facilities
which are not appropriate for their treatment needs; and it should
prevent overly restrictive commitment - that is, commitment to a
hospital when a community-based facility would be appropriate. It
could also be used to defend against the commitment of persons
with special needs to state hospitals which are not equipped to provide adequate treatment. 70
Medical Records

The provIsIon entitled "Medical Records" entails a major
change from prior law. 71 The old Hospitalization and Commitment
Act did not address the right of access to medical records. A law of
administration of major tranquilizers in "emergencies" involving "almost certain risk of imminent physical harm" and in certain non-emergency situations, Id., at 3000. Non-emergency administration is allowed only when the "patient lacks the ability to engage in a
rational decision-making process" regarding the medications. Id. at 4030.
65. Act of March 23, 1982, ch. 637, § I, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1521 (West).
66. See, e.g., Proposed Dept. Pub. WeI. Rule 39, 4 S!R. \027 (Dec. 12, 1979).
67. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd 7 (1982) replaces MINN. STAT. § 253A.17 subd. 9
(1980) (repealed August 1, 1982).
68. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. 1 (1982).
69. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd. 7 (1982).
70. For example, hearing impaired persons and autistically impaired persons.
71. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd. 8 (1982).
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general applicability provides for access but allows hospitals and
doctors to limit access under certain circumstances. 72 The new law
essentially removes all barriers to a committed person's access to his
or her medical records.
The section has two main provisions. First, it states that a "patient" has the "right to access to his medical records."73 This provision apparently allows unlimited access by committed patients to
their medical records. In addition, the use of the term "institutionalized" in the definition of "patient" suggests that persons who are
in facilities under the emergency hold or informal admission provisions of the Act, but not committed, also have such access to their
records.
The second part of the access section deals with people who are
"subject to a proceeding or receiving services pursuant to" the Act. 74
Such persons are granted the same access to medical records with
regard to their commitment as institutionalized persons. This provision would allow "proposed patients" to obtain records from previous hospitalizations, as well as current records, if they were needed
in or relevant to current commitment proceedings. The use of the
term "complete access" suggests that the access provision is to be
broadly construed.
The Civil Commitment Rules of Procedure provide additional
guidance about access to medical records. 75 Upon request, a party
in a commitment proceeding must allow the other party access to
medical records in the first party's control. The court is instructed to
exclude from evidence any "testimony based upon" or any portion
of any medical record "improperly withheld." The term "improperly withheld" evidently refers not only to records which the Petitioner failed to provide to the proposed patient upon request, but
also to records which a hospital or other provider failed to make
available to the proposed patient pursuant to the statute. Note that
the option of excluding records is available by rule, only to the proposed patient.
Right to Counsel

The proposed patient's right to counsel has long been a part of
72. MINN STAT. § 144.335 (1982).
73. "Patient" is defined as any person "institutionalized or committed" under the Act.
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. IS (1982).
74. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 subd. 8 (1982).
75. MINN. R. CIY. COMMITMENT 5.
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Minnesota Commitment Law. 76 The Supreme Court Study Commission found, "[I]t is clear that there is no uniformly accepted role
for the proposed patient's counsel in [commitment] proceedings."77
The Commission set out extensive recommendations regarding the
role of the proposed patient's attorneys.
In the subdivision dealing with right to counsel, the legislature
implemented the key parts of the Commission's Recommendaton. 78
These are the appointment of counsel immediately upon the petition
being filed; the requirement that counsel be available "throughout
the proceeding;" and the definition of the role of counsel as that of
"vigorous advocate" for his client. The Civil Commitment Procedural Rules elaborate on these basic themes, adopting many of the
more detailed parts of Recommendation 6. 79 Counsel is to be appointed when a petition for commitment is filed. A proposed patient is entitled to an appointed attorney "at any proceeding" under
the Act. Once appointed, a lawyer must continue to represent the
proposed patient unless released by the court. Thus, the lawyer'S
duty clearly extends beyond representing the proposed patient at the
commitment hearing. Counsel must also be provided for: any appeal that is taken, proceedings to review a commitment, and proceedings initiated by the proposed patient to obtain his release. 8o In
addition, it appears that persons committed as mentally ill and dangerous are entitled to counsel at special review board hearings, if
these are considered to be proceedings "under the Act." Patients on
provisional discharge are entitled to counsel in connection with proceedings to revoke the provisional discharge. 81
The Act specifies that the proposed patient's counsel "shall ad76. The old law read as follows:
The proposed patient shall be afforded an opportunity to be represented by counsel, and if neither the proposed patient nor others provide counsel, the court at the
time the examiners or licensed physicians are appointed shall appoint counsel to
represent the proposed patient. Counsel shall consult with the proposed patient
prior to the hearing and shall be given adequate time to prepare therefore.
MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 15 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
Under the old law, the right to appointed counsel did not depend upon the proposed
patients' inability to afford counsel. This feature properly takes account of the fact that
some, if not most, proposed patients, may not be competent to waive the right to counsel.
Thus, to ensure that the right is protected, the court must appoint counsel even for those who
can afford it.
77. Final Report, supra note 7, at 71 (Recommendation 6).
78. MINN. STAT. § 2538.03 subd. 9 (1982).
79. MINN. R. CIY. COMMITMENT 3 and 4.
80. MINN. STAT. § 2538.17 (1982). See also MINN. R. CIY. COMMITMENT 3.
81. MINN. STAT. § 2538.15 subd. 3 (1982).
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vocate vigorously on behalf [of his client]."82 This mandate should
put to rest the controversy which has raged over the proper role of
the proposed patient's counsel. The term "vigorous advocate" is not
consistent with the position advanced by some, that the proposed
patient's counsel is to function in a role akin to that of a guardian ad
litem, deciding what is "in the best interests" of the proposed patient, and acquiescing in commitment if such a course appeared
best. 83 The Act makes clear that, as in other proceedings, counsel
should take his instructions from his client, and advocate vigorously
within ethical bounds for that position. Moreover, the role of advocate for his client is ethically mandated. 84 Advocacy has also been
urged as the proper role by the American Bar Association. 85
The role of the attorney as a forceful advocate for his client
cannot be overemphasized. Many helping professionals will be telling the client to follow the course they believe to be in his best interest. Only the attorney will be representing the client's stated goal. If
the attorney abdicates his role, the client will have no one on whom
to rely.
The role of counsel as a "vigorous advocate" is characteristic of
the adversary system. The adversary method of justice is particularly important in cases of civil commitment. There is evidence
showing this method is especially helpful in counteracting bias on
behalf of the decision-maker. 86 Furthermore, the adversary system
"introduces a systematic evidentiary bias in favor of the party disadvantaged by the discovered facts,"87 because advocates confronted
with initially unfavorable facts more vigorously investigate the situation. Given the involvement of psychiatrists, psychologists, social
82. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 subd. 9 (1982). See also MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 4.01.
83. For example, in comments submitted to the Minnesota Supreme Court in connection with the Court's consideration of the proposed Special Rules of Procedure Governing
Proceedings Under the Hospitalization and Commitment Act, one attorney suggested the
following system:
A more workable system [than the proposed "advocacy model"] would be for the
court to apfoint lawyers [as] guardians ad litem and not as counsel. The guardian
ad litem would exercise fiduciary responsibility. If a lawyer as guardian ad litem
believes it is in the patient's best interests to fight a proposed commitment, he
should be able to request the court to appoint him counsel and then he could act as
an advocate.
84. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1160 (1971).
85. ABA Comm. on the Mentally Disabled, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care:
Proposals for Change 286 (1981).
86. See Thibaut, Walker, & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARv. L. REV. 386 (1972).
87. Lind, Thibaut, & Walker, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and
Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1143 (1973).
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workers, family members and many others, and the general perception of treatment as a positive factor, these counteracting effects of
the adversary system are vitaL Finally, there is evidence that advocacy is effective in reducing the number of commitments in two
ways: the number of court-ordered releases rises and psychiatrists
are more likely to discharge patients without seeking commitment. 88
Without effective advocacy, the determination of a client's future will be abdicated to the "medical, more particularly the psychiatric, profession with the legal process and the attorney assuming a
ceremonial function."89 Commitment is a legal act. The power of
the state, properly invoked, is the agent forcing someone into treatment. "[W]henever unalterable interferences with bodily integrity
place deprivations of liberty in issue, the law and not medicine is the
ultimate decision-maker."90 It violates the fundamental principles
of the legal system to allow the decision to become effectively nonjudiciaL FUlthermore, treatment may not really be in the client's
best interest:
The attorney who focuses on the parens patriae foundation for
civil commitment overlooks the deprivation of freedom involved
in these proceedings. He also overlooks other deprivations that
accompany involuntary placement in a mental hospital. A committed person loses his right to privacy because he is under constant observation by both hospital staff and other patients; he
may lose his autonomy through compulsory medication and
other intrusive treatment. A committed person may be subjected
to a hospital that is inadequately staffed, overcrowded, unsanitary, deplorably maintained and unable to offer protection from
the brutality of patients and attendants. A committed person suffers the social stigma of being a hospitalized mental patient, and
worse, one who has been found dangerous enough to be forcibly
hospitalized. This stigma also may involve more serious long
term consequences, such as the inability to obtain employment.
Attention to the negative consequences of involuntary hospitalization may undermine the attorney's view of civil commitment as
beneficent. 9I
88. Kumasaka & Stokes, Involuntary Hospitalization: Opinions and Allitudes of Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 13 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 201 (1972).
89. Cohan, The Function ofthe Allorney and the Commitment ofthe Mentally 111,44 TEX.
L. REV. 424, 424-25 (1966).
90. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 166 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 102
S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
91. Hiday, The Allorney's Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L. REV. 1027,
1045-46 (1982).
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At a more abstract level, a paternalistic proceeding damages the
public perception of justice. The adversary system is familiar to the
public and is more likely to be perceived as fair.92 The United
States Supreme Court has stated: "Departures from established
principles have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure,
but in arbitrariness."93 These departures demean both the client and
the legal system. The lawyer is charged with protecting both.
Occasionally a client may direct his attorney not to contest a
commitment petition. If the client is making a rational decision, the
attorney should, of course, follow the client's direction. 94 If the client is unable to make rational decisions or communicate effectively,
then the attorney may seek the appointment of a guardian ad
litem. 95
III.

INFORMAL ADMISSION PROCEDURE

The Act's preference for voluntary treatment is explicit. 96 This
preference is implicit in the provision which requires a finding that
no less restrictive alternative to commitment exists before an order
for commitment can be issued. 97 It is also consistent with the Minnesota Alcoholism and Intoxication Act which specifies a preference
for treating alcoholics voluntarily.98 Most important, the preference
for voluntarism is constitutionally required. 99
The Act's provision for informal admission has two important
elements. First, anyone age sixteen or over may request admission
as an informal patient. 100 A hospital may admit some minors for
voluntary care and treatment, although payment may have to be
arranged with an adult. Second, the statute states that "[t]he head of
the facility shall not arbitrarily withhold consent to informed hospitalization."101 Some treatment facilities are reluctant to accept volunteers. This provision emphasizes state policy favoring
voluntarism, and is intended to make these denials less frequent.
92. See Thibaut, Lind, & Walker, Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271
(1974).
93. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967).
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 212 (Alternative Draft, 1981).
95. Id. at 199 and 213 (DR7-101). See also MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 13.
96. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04 subd. 1 (1982) provides "Informal admission by consent is
preferred over involuntary commitment."
97. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04 subd. 2 (1982).
98. MINN. STAT. § 254A.02 (1982).
99. Price v. Shepard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 90S (1976).
100. MINN. STAT. § 253B.04 subd. 1 (1982).
101. Id.
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Any patient informally admitted must be informed of his right
to leave the facility within twelve hours of his request for admission
unless he is held under another provision of the Act, or was admitted as chemically dependent. 102 Anyone admitted as chemically dependent may leave within seventy-two hours after his request,
excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. 103 The patient's request to leave must be wJitten and submitted to the head of the
treatment facility.l04 After receiving a request to leave, the head of
the facility must either honor the request or petition for commitment
of the person. This petition is mandatory if the head of the treatment facility deems it in the "best interests" of the patient, his family or the public. 105
Under the Act a great deal more than the proposed patient's
"best interests" must be alleged in a petition in order to state any
cognizable cause of action. The head of the treatment facility'S obligation to file a petition when he believes it to be in the "best interests" of the patient, his family or the public, must be read in
conjunction with the statutory criteria for commitments. 106
IV.

EMERGENCY HOLD

Anyone may be admitted for emergency care and treatment if
the head of the facility consents after receiving a written report from
an examiner.107 The examiner's report must show that the person
was examined not more than fifteen days earlier; is in imminent
danger of causing injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained; is mentally ill, mentally retarded or chemically dependent;
and that a court order cannot be obtained in time to prevent the
injury. lOS
The contents of the report must be behavioral and specific
enough to allow review; mere conclusions are insufficient. 109 A copy
of the examiner's report must be served on the patient immediately
102. MINN. STAT. § 2538.04 subd. 2 (1982).
103. Id.
104. !d.
105. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 3 (1982).
106. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 (1982).
107. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. I (1982).
108. Id. Recall that an "examiner" is a physician or licensed consulting psychologist who
is "trained and practicing in the diagnosis and treatment of the alleged impairment." See
supra note 46-48 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 26, 33, & 36 describing the requisite behavioral descriptions.
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upon admission. The facility must keep a duplicate. I 10
Police and health officers may also institute an emergency
hold. III A peace or health officer may take a person into custody
and transport him to a treatment facility if the officer has reason to
believe the person is in imminent danger of harming himself or
others if not immediately restrained and is either mentally ill, mentally retarded or chemically dependent. 112 The officer must make
application for admission of the person to the treatment facility.
Like the examiner's statement supporting emergency confinement,l13 the officer's application must specify the reasons and circumstances for the detention. A copy of the officer's statement must
be "made available" to the person held. I 14
After a person is brought to a treatment facility and application
for admission has been made by the peace or health officer, the person may be admitted for emergency care and treatment if the head
of the facility consents and there is a written statement from the
medical officer on duty after a preliminary examination. This statement must be to the effect that the person is in imminent danger of
harming himself or others, and has symptoms of mental illness, retardation or chemical dependency.115 Admission to the facility is
not automatic upon the application of the police or health officer;
the preliminary examination provides additional assurance that admission is for a proper purpose. Note that this statement, unlike the
statement supporting the "head of the treatment facility" hold, need
not be made by an "examiner." Therefore, the statement will not be
insufficient merely because the medical officer on duty is not knowledgeable, trained and practicing in the diagnosis and treatment of
the particular disability involved.
These provisions for emergency holds allow curtailment of civil
rights on relatively weak grounds. To limit the danger of abuse, the
110. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. I (1982).
Ill. A "peace officer" is either a sheriff, municipal, or other local police officer or a State
Highway Patrol officer engaged in the authorized duties of his office. MINN. STAT.
§ 2538.02 subd. 16 (1982). A "health officer" is one licensed to practice medicine in Minnesota, a medical officer of the United States performing his official duties, a licensed consulting psychologist, a psychiatric social worker, a psychiatric nurse, a public health nurse, or
members of a formally designated pre-petition screening team. Id., subd. 9 & 12.
112. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 2 (1982). If the person is believed to be chemically
dependent but not a danger to person or property, the officer may return the person to his
home.
1l3. See supra notes 26, 33, & 36.
114. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 2 (1982).
115. Id.

HeinOnline -- 6 Hamline L. Rev. 61 1983

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

62

[Vol. 6

duration of the emergency confinement is limited to 72 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.116 Tacking two or
more consecutive holds violates the Act. This is not to say only one
such hold can be used during the course of a long hospitalization.
However, it would be improper to use emergency holds in such a
way as to create a period of involuntary hospitalization longer than
seventy-two hours. It would be improper to use a second period of
emergency detention unless a period of truly voluntary hospitalization had intervened subsequent to the first emergency hold. A period of hospitalization would be truly voluntary if the patient knew
of, and understood, his right to leave the hospital if he so chose.
A person may be held longer than seventy-two hours only upon
a court order issued in a commitment proceeding.117 If the head of
the facility believes a petition for commitment is "required" and
none has been filed, then he must petition. It should be emphasized
that a petition for commitment is not required after every seventytwo hour hold. There is evidently a belief by some facilities that a
petition must follow emergency confinement. Perhaps this is an effort to avoid future liability by showing good faith. Whatever the
reason, a petition is unwarranted unless the head of the facility believes one is needed for protection of the patient or others.
At the written request of the patient, and with the consent of
the treatment facility, anyone admitted on an emergency hold must
be changed to informal status. liS This underscores the point that a
commitment petition is not inevitable. Emergency provisions are
available for crisis management. After the crisis has passed, the person has his usual opportunity to receive voluntary care and
treatment.
Anyone held under the emergency provisions must be informed, in writing at the time of admission, of his rights: to leave
after seventy-two hours, to have a medical exam within forty-eight
hours, to have the venue of any commitment petition changed to his
Minnesota county of residence I 19 and to become an informal patient. 120 Furthermore, the head of the treatment facility must assist
116.

MINN. STAT.

§ 2538.05 subd. 3 (1982).

117. Id. The proceeding must be held either in the person's county of residence or where

a facility is located.
118. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 4 (1982).
119. Under MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd 3 (1982), if the head of the facility believes
commitment is required and the facility is not located in the patient's county of residence,
the patient may move to have the venue changed.
120. MINN. STAT. § 2538.05 subd. 5 (1982).
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the person in the exercise of these rights if requested to do SO.121
Additional protection is provided by the requirement that the
patient be examined by a physician within at least forty-eight hours
of admission. 122 Anyone held under an emergency provision must
be discharged if there is no exam within forty-eight hours or if the
physician does not conclude that the person is either mentally ill,
retarded or chemically dependent and in need of care, treatment or
evaluation. 123 Thus emergency confinement requires rapid examination; continued emergency confinement requires at least some
corroboration.
V.

JUDICIAL COMMITMENT - PRELIMINARY PROCEDURES

Screening Team Investigation
Before filing a petition, a prospective petitioner must ask the
county to conduct a preliminary investigation. 124 The request is
made to the "designated agency," ie., the agency selected by the
county board to provide services under the Act. The agency must
then appoint a screening team to conduct the investigation. The
composition of the "screening team" is unspecified in the statute.
One example is Hennepin County where there is an eighteen-member team composed of one psychiatrist, one licensed consulting psychologist, four social workers, five chemical dependency counselors,
three mental health workers, and four nurses.
The investigation includes four elements. The screening team
should interview the proposed patient. 125 If this interview does not
take place the reasons for failure to do so must be documented. The
team must also interview other persons with knowledge of the proposed patient's condition. 126 The specific alleged conduct which
serves as the basis for the petition must be identified and investigated;127 and the screening team must identify and explore alternatives to involuntary commitment. 128 Specific reasons must be given
for rejecting any of the alternatives.
The screening team has an affirmative duty to refuse to support
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
MINN. STAT.

§ 2538.06 (1982).

Id.
MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 1 (1982).
/d., subd. I(a)(i).
/d.
Id., subd. 1(a)(ii).
Id., subd. 1(a)(iii).
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a petition if its investigation fails to indicate that commitment is
proper. The prospective petitioner must be given notice of this decision. 129 The prospective petitioner may appeal the decision of the
screening team to the county attorney, who must decide whether to
proceed with the petition and must convey his decision to the prospective petitioner. 13o The statute is silent about the procedure if the
county attorney should refuse, but the law allows "any interested
person" to file a petition in the probate court. J3J
. If commitment is recommended by the screening team, the
team must send a written report to the county attorney in the county
where the petition will be filed. 132 The county attorney's representation of the petitioner is presumed here and elsewhere. 133 The old
law provided that the petitioner had to request that the county attorney appear. 134 The county attorney may file the petition prior to
receiving the screening team's report. Clearly, this should occur
only in emergency situations where it can be demonstrated that
harm may result if the petitioner awaits the report.
The Act provides that in conducting its investigation the screening team may have access to all relevant medical records of proposed patients who are currently in treatment facilities. 135 These
records, in the hands of the team, are "private data on individuals,"136 and use thereof is governed by the Minnesota Government
Data Practices Act. 137
The interrelationship between the Commitment Act and the
Data Practices Act raises two questions. First, the Data Practices
Act imposes certain requirements for disclosures to subjects of private data prior to the collection of the data. To what extent do these
requirements govern the screening team's access to medical records?
Second, what is the effect of the "private" classification on the
screening team's right to disseminate the data it has collected?
At the core of the Data Practices Act is the requirement that the
129. Id., subd. I(d).
130. /d., subd. I(e).
131. Id., sUbd. 2.
132. Id., subd. I (c).
133. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 5 (1982) providing that ''The county attorney and the patient's attorney may be present during the [pre-hearing] examination."
134. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 5 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
135. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. I(b) (1982).
136. /d.
137. See generally MINN. STAT. §§13.01-.87 (1982). "Private data on individuals" is defined as' "data which is made by statute ... (a) not public; and (b) accessible to the individual subject of that data." MINN. STAT. § 13.02 subd. 12 (1982).
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collection, storage and dissemination of private data be governed by
the purposes stated to the subject of the data at the time of collection. 13,8 While there are exceptions to this general rule,139 none apply to the collection of private data. Thus, the Data Practices Act
seems to require that the screening team give the proposed patient,
who is the subject of the private data to be collected, the statement
of "purpose and intended use" prior to the "collection" of the medical records. 140
The second question involving the Data Practices Act concerns
the dissemination of information from the medical records, or the
records themselves, by the screening team. Dissemination of private
data is governed by two provisions of the Data Practices Act. In
general, private data can be disseminated only in accordance with
the purposes stated to the subject of the data at the time the data was
collected. 141 Second, the screening team is permitted to allow another governmental agency access to the data only when the access
is "authorized or required" by law. 142 Arguably, the screening
team's obligation to submit a report to the county attorney concerning petitions it recommends "authorizes" the dissemination of the
medical records. However, further clarity would be useful in this
regard.
In the view of the authors, allowing the screening team unbridled access to medical records without the proposed patient's consent poses a potentially serious threat of unauthorized invasion of
privacy. It must be recalled that the pre-petition screening team is
an arm of the government. This provision purports to provide these
governmental agents seemingly uncontrolled access to medical
records, the type of information which heretofore has been accorded
extraordinary protections. Regardless of the outcome under the
138. MINN. STAT. § 13.05 subd. 4 (1982) provides that private data on individuals may
be disseminated only if the individual has given his or her informed consent. Informed
consent exists where the subject has signed a dated statement which, in plain language, specifically identifies the person or agency authorized to disclose the information, the nature of
the information to be disclosed, the persons or agencies to whom the information may be
disclosed, the purposes for which the information may be used, and the expiration date of
the informed consent. ld., subd. 4(d). Further, the subject must be informed of the "purpose and intended use" of the requested information, whether he is legally required to supply the information, any known consequences from refusing to supply the information, and
the identity of other persons or entities authorized by law to receive the information. MINN.
STAT. § 13.04 (1982).
139. MINN. STAT. § 13.05 subd. 4(a)-(c) (1982).
140. See supra note 138.
141. MINN. STAT. § 13.05 subd, 4 (1982).
142. ld., subd. 9.
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Data Practices Act, access to medical records without consent
should rarely be necessary to determine that a petition ought to be
brought. If the sort of grossly disturbed behavior required by the
Act as a precondition to commitment has not been publicly observed, then it is probable that the proposed patient is functioning
adequately and need not be committed. There may be instances of
course, where hospital records may reveal that despite the recommendation of a physician, commitment is not required. In such
cases, it should be adequate to rely on the proposed patient's consent in order to gain access to the records.
In any event, it should be recalled that "[c]ollection and storage
of. . . private. . . data on individuals and use and dissemination
of private ... data on individuals shall be limited to that necessary
for the administration and management" ofthe program of pre-petition screening. 143 Thus, the screening team should not attempt to
collect information pursuant to this section unless it can determine
that the information is "necessary" to its function, pre-petition
screening. In order to make this determination, the team should
have some probable cause to believe that specific information in the
records will make a material difference as to whether commitment
should be recommended.
Two virtually identical federal statutes appear to limit release
of records kept by federally assisted drug abuse prevention programs. l44 The statutes are based on a belief that drug abuse treatment is best served by assuring confidentiality to participants. The
applicable records are confidential and may be disclosed only as authorized and "may not otherwise be divulged in any civil, criminal,
administrative, or legislative proceeding conducted by any Federal,
State, or local authority . . . . "145 This prohibition is strict and,
pursuant to the statute, regulations have sharply limited even the
use of informers in drug treatment programs. 146
These records may be disclosed pursuant to narrow exceptions
to the general rule of confidentiality. A court may order disclosure
if it finds good cause shown, restricts disclosure only to that required
to satisfy such good cause and protects against unauthorized disclo143.
144.
145.
146.
1977);

/d., subd. 3.

21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1981); 42 U.S.c. 4582 (1981).
42 C.F.R. § 2113(a) (1981).
42 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1981). See, e.g., United States v. Coffman, 567 F.2d 960 (10th Cir.
Armenta v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1976).
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sure of the information. 147 "Good cause" is found only when the
public interest in disclosure outweighs the "injury to the patient, to
the physician-patient relationship and to the treatment services."148
Disclosure must be limited to items essential to the objective of ~he
order and to "those persons whose need for information is the basis
for the order."149 Generally, only objective data may be disclosed,
e.g., dates of enrollment, attendance, and discharge. Communications by a patient to program personnel are barred unless put in
issue by the patient. 150
Presuming a court uses the proper test and finds it appropriate
to require disclosure of the data, a subpoena plus a court order is
required. The order merely removes the barrier; the subpoena then
compels disclosure.
The penalty for violation of the statute is a fine of not more
than $500 for the first offense and not more than $5,000 for subsequent offenses. 151 A violation may also give rise to a private cause
of action for invasion of privacy. 152
The Petition

Any interested person may file a petition for commitment. 153
The petition may be filed in the probate court of the county of the
proposed patient's residence or presence. 154 The petition must contain the name of the proposed patient, his address, the names and
addresses of his nearest relatives and the reasons for the petition. 155
The reasons for the petition must be presented in factual descriptions of recent behavior and not just psychiatric and medical diagnoses. The vagaries of psychiatric diagnoses and prognoses are well
documented. 156 Indeed, there is little doubt that past behavior is the
147. 21 U.S.C. § 1175(b)(2)(c) (1981); 42 C.F.R. § 2.64g (1981).
148. Id. See In re Doe Children, 93 Misc.2d 479, 402 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Fam. Ct. 1978).
149. 42 C.F.R. § 2.64(g)(I) and (2) (1981).
150. 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (1981).
151. 21 U.S.C. § 1175(1) (1981).
152. Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F.Supp. 1328, 1384 (D.D.C. 1978). This is limited to jurisdictions that recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
153. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 2 (1982). See MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 10 (1982)
defining "interested person" as "an adult including but not limited to, a public official, and
the legal guardian, spouse, parent, legal counsel, adult child, next of kin, or other person
designated by a proposed patient.".
154. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 2 (1982).
155. Id.
156. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption oj Expertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 66 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974).
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best predictor of future behavior. 157 Therefore the Act correctly focuses on behavior and provides that petitions "shall not contain
judgmental or conclusory statements."158
A written report of an examiner must accompany the petition.159 This report must show that the proposed patient was examined within the fifteen days preceding the filing of the petition. A
finding that the proposed patient is suffering a designated disability
must be in the report, as well as a finding that commitment to a
treatment facility is appropriate. The reasons for this opinion must
also be set out in detail. This written report is unnecessary if the
petitioner is unable to obtain an examination and can document a
reasonable effort to secure one. In this event, a determination to
commit would presumably be based entirely on behavioral evidence. However, the pre-petition screening team will often be able
to provide this report.
The court may order a proposed patient held or taken into custody and transported to a treatment facility at this point if there has
been a particularized showing that "serious imminent physical
harm" to the proposed patient or others is likely, the proposed patient has failed to appear voluntarily for either the examination or
the hearing, or there has been a request for commitment of a person
held under the emergency provisions. 16o The apprehend and hold
order may be executed at any time and by use of all necessary
means including restraining the proposed patient. 161
Anyone held pursuant to an apprehend and hold order may be
held no more than seventy-two hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.162 Thereafter there must be a preliminary
hearing to determine whether there is probable cause for a continu157. See MEEHL, CLINICAL vs. STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954); MONO HAN, THE
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981).
158. MINN STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 2 (1982). The behavioral descriptions must be specific
as to where, duration and witnesses to the behavior documented.
159. ld.
160. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 6 (1982). The court should consider whether the
emergency provisions have been properly invoked before issuing a hold order on the basis
that there has been a request for commitment under the emergency provisions. MINN. R.
CIV. COMMITMENT 2.02, makes it clear that an apprehend and confine order on this ground
may not be issued unless the court specifically finds, that "serious imminent physical harm
is likely" if the order is not issued. Note that this provision is permissive, the court may issue
the order in these cases, and only these cases.
161. MINN. R. CIv. COMMITMENT 2.02. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a peace
officer executing the order shall not be in uniform or a marked car.
162. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 7(a) (1982).
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ing hold. 163 This hearing is constitutionally required. 164 The proposed patient must be represented by counsel at the hearing; 165 and
written notice of the hearing and the alleged grounds for confinement must precede the preliminary hearing by at least twenty-four
hours.166 Notice must be given to the proposed patient, his attorney,
the county attorney, the petitioner, and others as the court may
direct.
The only ground supporting an order for continued pre-hearing
confinement is a finding that "serious imminent physical harm" to
the proposed patient or others is likely if the proposed patient is not
confined. 167 The burden of proof is on the petitioner; the standard
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. "Reliable" hearsay evidence, including written reports, is admissible. 168
Pre-Hearing Examination

The Act changes the old law relating to the pre-hearing examination of the proposed patient in subtle, but important ways. An
examination has always been required to precede the commitment
hearing. The Act, however, more rigidly separates the examination
from the hearing in terms of time. The report of the examiner must
be filed in triplicate with the court at least forty-eight hours before
the hearing. 169 Only the attorney for the proposed patient can agree
to a lesser time.
As under the old law, the examination must occur in a suitable
place determined unlikely to affect the proposed patient adversely.170 Altering prior practice,171 the Act expressly grants the
163. Id.
164. State ex rei. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1980).
165. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 7(b) (1982).
166. The notice must state the time, place and the alleged grounds for the confinement.
167. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 7(c) (1982). "Imminent"means "threatening to occur
immediately." Peterson v. Long, 239 Minn. 319, 325, 58 N.W.2d 609, 615 (1953) quoting
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1947).
168. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 7(b) (1982). "Reliability" of hearsay evidence is to be
determined by the court.
169. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07 subd. 5 (1982). Copies are also to be sent to the proposed
patient and his attorney.
170. Any questions about the suitability of the place of the examination would be appropriately raised either by motion prior to the hearing or at the hearing. The Act does not
specify the consequence which follows from a showing that an examination was conducted
in an unsuitable place. Four alternatives present themselves. The court might dismiss the
petition. Such an action would be premised on the assumption that a proper examination is
a necessary element of the petitioner's case. More likely, the court would order the examination redone. However, the commitment hearing must be held within 14 days of the filing of
the petition, unless "good cause" is shown for an extension of that time period. MINN. STAT.
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county attorney· and the attorney for the proposed patient the right
to be present during the examination, though either party may
waive this right. Formerly, presence at the examination required
authorization by the examiners.
In another significant change from the old law, the Act requires
court appointment of only one examiner initially. The court must
appoint a second examiner "of the patient's choosing" at the request
of the proposed patient. 172 This second examiner is to be paid by
the county at a rate set by the court. The court must prepare a list of
regularly employed examiners but neither the court nor the proposed patient is limited to the examiners on the list. 173 Each county
or court may adopt local rules governing the timing of the request
for a second examiner.174 A rule requiring the request to be made in
time to allow the second report to be filed with the court at least 48
hours before the hearing would be proper. This would put the two
reports on the same footing and give each side t4e same minimum
time to prepare its case. However, a local rule requiring the request
to be made prior to the filing of the first report would lead cautious
defense counsel to request a second examination as a matter of
course.
The proposed patient must be summoned to appear for the
exam and for the hearing. 175 Thus apprehend and hold orders, 176are
conceived of as the exceptional case. The proposed patient must be
personally served with this summons, a plain language notice of
proceedings and notice that the petition has been filed, a copy of the
petition, a copy of the physician's supporting statement,177 the order
for examination, and a copy of the pre-petition screening report. 178
§ 2538.08 subd. I (1982). It might be impossible to schedule the re-examination within the
14 day period. If the court determined that the circumstances did not constitute "good
cause" to extend the time for the hearing, then dismissal might be appropriate. A final
alternative would be for the court to allow testimony regarding the examination. In that
case, concern about the suitability of the place of the examination would properly be raised
to impeach the examiner.
171. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 2 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
172. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 3 (1982) (emphasis added).
173. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 7 and Comment A.
174. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 7.03.
175. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 4 (1982).
176. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
177. A statement from an "examiner" is required generally. The term "physician" in
MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 4 (1982) appears to be simply an inadvertent vestige of the
prior law.
178. Supra note 170. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, service must be made by a
non-uniformed person.
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Service of these documents must also be made on the attorney for
the proposed patient, the petitioner, all interested persons and others
as the court directs.
If the proposed patient fails to respond to the summons, an apprehend and hold order may issue. 179 This results in a maximum of
seventy-two hours of confinement unless serious physical harm to
the proposed patient or others is found likely. A logistical problem
arises. If the orders for the exam and for the hearing are ignored,
two apprehend and hold orders would be needed unless the hearing
were held within the seventy-two hour allowable confinement period or likelihood of imminent harm is found. Given the requirement that the reports of the examination(s) be filed at least fortyeight hours before the hearing, it would be difficult to hold the hearing within the seventy-two hour period of confinement. Hopefully
this will not result in an unnecessarily large number of findings that
imminent and serious physical harm is likely without continued
confinement.
Hearing Procedures

The hearing must take place within fourteen days of the date
the petition is filed. 180 The court can extend this time up to thirty
more days for "good cause shown." Therefore, one could be confined by court order up to forty-four days without a hearing on the
merits of the petition. 181 This is a large invasion of civil liberties
and "good cause" should be rigidly construed. An example of good
cause might be physical illness of the proposed patient. Any continuance should be limited to the minimum time necessary to proceed
with the trial. Arguably, "good cause" would not exist where the
only reason for the extension of time was to allow another week of
treatment in the hope that the proposed patient would then be ready
for release. This would in essence use the order for hearing and
confinement as a therapeutic lever. However benevolent this might
appear, it constitutes a violation of due process. The penalty for
failure to hold the hearing in the required time is mandatory dismissal of the petition. 182
An immediate hearing may be demanded in writing by either
179. MINN. STAT. § 2538.07 subd. 6 (1982). See supra note 160 for discussion of apprehend and hold orders.
180. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 1 (1982).
181. See State ex reI Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1980).
182. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 1 (1982).
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the head of the treatment facility or the proposed patient. Followmg this demand, the hearing must be held within five days of the
"date of demand," excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.183 The term "date of demand" is undefined but likely means
the date the demand is filed. The demand is, after all, made on the
court. If the hearing is not timely held after such ~ demand, the
proposed patient must be discharged. For good cause shown the
court can, however, extend the time for hearing an additional ten
days. Again, "good cause shown" should be narrowly construed to
avoid subversion of the statute. The penalty for failure to hold an
immediate hearing within the alloted time is discharge of the patient
if he is being held under court order. However, the petition need
not be dismissed.
At least five days' notice that a hearing will be held must be
given to the proposed patient, the patient's attorney, the petitioner,
the Commissioner of Public Welfare if the proposed patient is not a
Minnesotan, and others as the court may direct. 184 At least two
days' notice of the specific date of the hearing must be given to the
same persons. 18S Notice to the proposed patient may be waived by
his counse1. Note that the statute no longer requires notice "by the
court." Thus, as in the preliminary notices, notice should be given
by petitioner.
The court must notify all those receiving notices of the hearing,
except the proposed patient's attorney, that they also have a right to
be present and testify. However, anyone unnecessary for the conduct of the hearing may be excluded by the court, except those
whose presence is requested by the proposed patient. 186
The proposed patient has a right to be present at all proceedings. The right to be present may be waived if the waiver is on the
record and determined to be freely given. 187 In rare instances the
court 'may exclude a proposed patient who is "seriously disruptive"
or who is "totally incapable of comprehending and participating in
183. Id.
184. Id., subd. 2.
185. Id.
186. The purpose of the provision allowing the court to exclude unnecessary persons
from the hearing is to protect the privacy of the proposed patient. For example, the court
might exclude reporters or casual courtroom observers who have no connection to the proceeding. Those whose presence is re~uested by the proposed patient must be allowed to
attend. This insures that the proceedmg will be open to outside scrutiny if the proposed
patient so requests.
187. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 5 (1982).
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the proceedings."188 At the hearing, the proposed patient must not
be so under the influence of the medication or other treatment that it
hampers his participation in the hearing. If the discontinuance of
the medication or treatment is deemed not in his best interest, then a
record of the medication or treatment given in the prior forty-eight
hours shall be presented at the hearing. 189
The hearing need not be in the courthouse but must be in a
"courtroom." This room may be in a treatment facility but it must
meet standards prescribed by local court rule. 190 In a nutshell, the
courtroom must be separate from treatment areas of the hospital
and must provide adequate room to separate the participants in the
proceeding. The hearing must be conducted in a manner consistent
with orderly courtroom procedure. 191 This alters prior law which
mandated a hearing as "informal as may be consistent with orderly
procedure and in a physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the mental health of the proposed patient."192 There is now
a move toward formalizing the commitment process. There is little
reason not to hold the vast majority of hearings at the courthouse.
This will clearly distinguish the judicial proceeding from the psychiatric case conference. The cost of transporting proposed patients is
probably less than having the court personnel travel. Very few proposed patients are too physically ill to travel or suffer any harm
from the trip. If the proposed patient is temporarily too ill, a continuance would be possible.
Both parties may present and cross-examine witnesses, and the
court may in its discretion receive the testimony of anyone else. 193
All relevant evidence shall be admitted at the hearing. This does
188. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 10. Before excluding a proposed patient who is "seriously disruptive," the court should make specific findings, on the record, of the proposed
patient's behavior. Since exclusion should occur only "in rare instances," only disruption
which renders it impossible to continue the hearing should result in exclusion.
Prior to excluding a proposed patient on the grounds that he is "totally incapable of
comprehending and participating in the proceedings," a hearing should be held at which the
parties can produce evidence concerning that subject. The proposed patient should be at
that hearing. Clearly, no proposed patient should be excluded on this ground over his objection since an objection indicates an ability to "participate" in the proceeding. However, the
converse does not hold true. Since the Act permits exclusion only for ''total'' incapacity, the
mere lack of an objection to exclusion would not be sufficient to justify exclusion.
189. MINN. STAT. § 253B.08 subd. 5 (1982).
190. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 9.02, sets forth minimum standards for courtrooms
which are located in treatment facilities.
191. MINN. STAT. § 253B.08 subd. 6 (1982).
192. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 13 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
193. MINN. STAT. § 253B.08 subd. 4 and 7 (1982).
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not alter the usual standards, for the same provision requires that
the court's determination be made "upon the entire record pursuant
to the rules of evidence." 194 Commitment is a "massive curtailment
of liberty,"195 and "[t]he loss of liberty produced by an involuntary
commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement."196
The dangers inherent in hearsay and the consequences of its admission are as significant in commitments as in criminal cases. Hearsay
. should be admissible only under an exception to hearsay rule. Reliable hearsay may be admissible under one of the catch-all exceptions. 197 However, the general hearsay rule should be followed,
including adequate prior notice of the intent to use it. 198
The report of a court-appointed examiner is inadmissible unless the examiner is present and available for examination or the
parties agree. 199 The new law omits the formerly explicit point that
the opinions of the examiners are not binding on the court.200 Given
the ultimately legal nature of the proceeding, however, it is clear
that the decision is for the court and not the examiners.
The standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. 201
There was need for clarification because dictum in Lausche v. Commissioner 0/ Public Welfare 202 suggested a stricter standard,203 and
in Addington v. Texas,204 the United States Supreme Court cited
Minnesota as a state requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court must commit the proposed patient if it finds that he is
either mentally ill, chemically dependent, or mentally retarded and
194. Id.
195. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
196. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980).
197. MINN. R. EVID. 803(24), 804.
198. See 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 472, 491 (1980).
199. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 4 (1982).
200. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 13 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982).
201. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. I (1982). This is consistent with Addington V. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1978), and State ex rei Doe V. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1980). But
see Matteston, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Inadequacy 0/ Existing Procedural and
Substantive Protections, 28 UCLA L. REV. 906, 925-28 (1981).
202. 302 Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974).
203. Id. at 369. At proceedings to determine whether to grant petition to release patient
committed as MI & D, the probate court of appeals panel reversed the commissioner's order
to discharge. The patient asserted that the standard of proof at these supplementary proceedings must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient is mentally ill. The
Minnesota Supreme Court responded to this argument as follows: "Although this is the
necessary standard to be employed with regard to the initial commitment . . . we cannot
extend it to supplementary proceedings. . . ." Id.
204. 441 U.S. at 431 n. 5.
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there is no less restrictive alternative to commitment. 205 As noted
earlier, the definitions of all three mental conditions include the requirement that the person has recently demonstrated that he is a
danger to himself or to others.206 This element is constitutionally
required.207
Any mental impairment will actually be inferred from behavior.208 Thus, the statute properly focuses on past behavior by requiring a demonstrated failure to care for oneself or a demonstrated risk
to another. Moreover, the findings must "specifically state the proposed patient's conduct which is a basis for determining that each of
the requisites for commitment is met."209 Documentation of past
behavior is crucial given the fledgling status of prediction in the
mental health field and the well established fact that past behavior is
the best predictor of future behavior. 210
If commitment is ordered, the court's findings must list the less
. restrictive alternatives which were rejected and the reasons for rejection.2lJ The court must find that there is no suitable alternative including, but not limited to, dismissal of the petition, voluntary
outpatient care, voluntary admission to a treatment facility, appointment of a guardian or conservator, or release before commitment to
the care and custody of another person or to an agency on conditions guaranteeing care and treatment of the proposed patient. 212
This section is similar to the old provision. 213 The Act adds the possibility that release could be to "an agency". This opens significant
possibilities to explore new alternatives to commitment, for example, release to a hospital. No one against whom criminal proceedings are pending can be released under this section.
205. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 1 (1982).
206. "Mentally ill" see supra note 17 and accompanying text. "Chemically dependent"
see supra note 13 and accompanying text. "Mentally retarded" see supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
207. "Assuming that that term can be given a reasonably precise context and that the
'mentally ill' can be identified with a reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live
safely in freedom." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
208. See Morse, A Preference jor Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of
the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 59-62 (1982).
209. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 2 (1982).
210. See MEEHL, CLINICAL V.S. STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954). See also Cocozza &
Steadman, The Failure ojPsychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976).
211. MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 2 (1982).
212. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. 1 (1982).
213. MINN. STAT. § 253A.12 subd. 1 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982).
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A guardian or conservator of the person has the power to establish the place of abode for the incapacitated person. 214 A ward or
conservatee, however, may not be admitted to any "state institution"
except pursuant to commitment. 2ls Note, however, that the Commissioner of Public Welfare as guardian or conservator of a mentally retarded ward can admit a ward or conservatee to a state
institution for up to ninety days in any calendar year for "temporary
care."216 This would be a less restrictive alternative than commitment for mentally retarded wards of the Commissioner.
The burden to establish that there is no less restrictive alternative to commitment rests on petitioner, for it is an essential element
of his case. This is grounded in the principle that even where the
goal is worthy, it "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."217 This burden is not carried merely by alleging that a
particular outcome is best or clinically the most appropriate for the
proposed patient. It is also important from a clinical point of view
that less restrictive alternatives be ruled out. There is evidence that
too many people are institutionalized and that institutionalization is
often dysfunctionaPI8
The least restrictive alternative principle has a second application in the Act. Once it is determined that the criteria for commitment have been met, and that there is no alternative available less
restrictive than involuntary treatment, the court must determine
which treatment facility can meet the proposed patient's needs consistent with the statutory "right to treatment" provisions, in the least
restrictive manner.219 This is a separate question from whether less
restrictive alternatives to commitment itself exist. This is a question
of the destination of the committed patient.
The term "least restrictive manner" is not defined in the Act.
Often, the relative degrees of restrictiveness between two alternatives are obvious. Thus, being committed to an outpatient medica214. MINN. STAT. § 525.56 subd. 1 (1982).
215. Id.
216. MINN. STAT. § 252A.ll subd. 3 (1982).
217. Shelton V. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See a/so Lake V. Cameron, 364 F.2d
657 (D.C.Cir. 1966); Welch V. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 501-02 (D. Minn. 1974); Lessard V.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
414 U.S. 473 (1974); Note, Less /Jrastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L. J. 464
(1969).
218. See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972);
Kiesler, Mental Hospitals and Alternative Care, 37 AM. PSYCHIATRY 349 (1982).
219. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 subd. 7 (1982); MINN. STAT. § 253B.09 subd. 1 (1982).

HeinOnline -- 6 Hamline L. Rev. 76 1983

41]

CIVIL COMMITMENT ACT: 1982

77

tion clinic in one's home community is clearly less restrictive than
being committed to a state hospital. Other comparisons are not so
clear. Some would argue that commitment to a state hospital is less
restrictive than commitment to a board and care home located in a
high crime area of a city. Similarly some might argue that it is less
restrictive to be committed to the security hospital than to be kept
on a locked ward at an "open" hospital.
Several factors should be considered in making the restrictiveness determination. The degree to which the patient's normal pattern of life is disrupted is an important factor. Thus, while the
campus-like setting of a state hospital may appear more pleasant
than the inner city setting of a community treatment facility, the
latter may more closely approximate the life from which the patient
has come, and to which he will return. Second, attention should be
paid to the treatment methods used by the facility. Facilities which
use aversive or deprivational techniques should be viewed as more
restrictive than those emphasizing positive reinforcement and voluntary participation in treatment. Lastly, the views of the patient
should not be overlooked in determining restrictiveness. In the long
run, the patient's cooperation and trust is critical in insuring successful treatment.
It seems most appropriate to request the pre-petition screening
team to designate an appropriate facility in the event that commitment is ordered. 220 Of course the petitioner may request another
facility. The requirement that the least restrictive treatment facility
be used suggests that commitment to outpatient care is possible.
The definition of "treatment facility,"221 is broad enough to encompass an outpatient facility. A fine line would appear to exist, however, between those appropriate for voluntary outpatient treatment,
and hence not commitable, and those who may be committed to
outpatient care. 222
220. The pre-petition screening unit must detennine whether there are alternatives less
restrictive than commitment. This should entail a study of the proposed patient's treatment
needs. The pre-petition screening unit should be able to recommend a facility which can
meet those needs in the least restrictive manner.
221. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 19 (1982).
222. Some patients who refuse voluntary treatment may participate in outpatient treatment as committed patients simply because they have been ordered by the committing court
to do so. Others may participate as committed patients because they are aware that the
consequence for failure to participate is commitment on an in-patient basis.
It follows that the committing court should not reject outpatient treatment as a disposition merely because the proposed patient would not voluntarily cooperate with such treatment. The relevant questions are, first, whether such treatment would meet the proposed
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If commitment is ordered, a copy of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and of the order must accompany the patient "at the
time of admission."223 The law is clear but will create a logistical
problem. Hopefully this provision will be amended to allow the
committing court administrative leeway, seventy-two hours,
perhaps.
VI.

POST-COMMITMENT

The initial commitment period is not more than six months,224
unless the person is mentally ill and dangerous to the public225 or
the petition resulting in the commitment was filed while the person
was committed and the petition results in a period of continuous
commitment. 226 This changes the old law significantly. Formerly
the only finite commitment related to inebriates; a first commitment
could last no longer than forty-five days; subsequent commitments
for inebriety terminated by law in not more than eighteen
months.2 27 Commitments for an indefinite period are very likely
unconstitutional. 228
The head of the treatment facility must file a treatment report
with the committing court" [at] least 60 days but not more than 90
... days after the commencement of the initial commitment. . . ."229 This "commencement of the initial commitment" is
from the date of the order for commitment. The patient must be
discharged and the proceedings terminated if this report is either not
timely filed, or describes the patient as not in need of further institutionalization. 230 If the patient is discharged before sixty days, then
the report is due at the time of discharge.
This report must contain the following: a diagnosis with supporting data; an anticipated discharge date; a detailed description of
the discharge planning process; a suggested aftercare plan; an opinion on whether further care and treatment are needed and the evipatient's treatment needs, and, second, whether the proposed patient would cooperate with
such treatment if he is ordered to do so and knows the consequence of failure to do so.
223. MINN. STAT. § 2538.10 subd. 1 (1982).
224. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. 5 (1982).
225. See MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 17 (1982).
226. See supra text accompanying note 117.
227. MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 17 (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982).
228. See Comment, Substantive Oue Process Limits on the Ouration on Civil Commitment
jor the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 205 (1981).
229. MINN. STAT. § 2538.09 subd. 5 (1982).

230. Id.
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dence supporting this conclusion; whether further care and
treatment must be provided in a treatment facility and the evidence
supporting this conclusion, whether the head of the facility believes
continued commitment is statutorily justifiable and documenta.tion
supporting this conclusion. This information must be in narrative
form,231 and a copy must be sent to the patient and his attorney. No
hearing is necessary after this report is filed.
In addition to the sixty to ninety day report, a second report is
required either upon discharge or at the end of the initial six month
commitment period, whichever is sooner.232 If the report is not
timely filed, the patient must be discharged and the proceedings terminated. 233 In this report, the head of the treatment facility must
state his opinion as to whether continued treatment is necessary. If
this opinion states the patient is not in need of further commitment,
he must be discharged.234 If the opinion is that continued commitment is necessary, the court must hold a hearing before making a
final decision. 235 A representative of the treatment facility is the
moving party at the hearing. 236

Continued Commitment
The hearing must be held within fourteen days after the committing court receives the report of the head of the treatment facility.237 For good cause shown, the court may continue the hearing.
At least five days notice of the time and place of the hearing must be
given to the patient, his attorney, the original petitioner, and others
as the court may direct.
Continued commitment is unjustified unless, after a hearing,
the court finds that the patient continues to be mentally ill, retarded,
or chemically dependent, commitment is required for the protection
231. The Minnesota Supreme Court Study Commission's Report found that many reports by the hospital to the court were extremely brief and conclusory. "Most reports state
conclusions and recommendations with no supporting factual-behavioral basis." Final Report, supra note 7, at 45. To remedy this and meet the Act's requirement that reports be in
"narrative form," the report should specify the facts which underlie its conclusions and
recommendations.
232. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12 subd. 1 (1982).
233. Id., subd. 2.
234. Id.
235. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12 subd. 4 (1982). The patient, after consulting with counsel,
may waive this hearing. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12 subd. 6 (1982).
236. This is appropriate because the facility will have the most knowledge of the patient
at this point.
237. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12 subd. 5 (1982).
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of the patient or others, and there is no alternative to commitment. 238 The standard of proof is once again clear and convincing
evidence.239 There is, however, an apparent difference between the
criteria for continued commitment of the mentally ill and those for
the chemically dependent and mentally retarded. Continued commitment of the mentally ill does not require a finding of a recent
attempt or threat to physically harm self or others, or a recent failure
to provide essentials for oneself.240 However, it must be found this
type of behavior is "likely" to occur.241 A finding that a person continues to be mentally retarded 242 or chemically dependent243 is required for continued commitment of these persons. It must be
recalled, however, that the definitions of "mentally retarded" and
"chemically dependent" include behavioral components. 244 Taking
this along with the language requiring a finding that continued commitment is the only alternative, it is clear that the Act requires the
usual grounds for commitment to exist before continuing the commitment of the chemically dependent or mentally retarded.
Not requiring a recent, overtly dangerous act or threat before
ordering continued commitment of the mentally ill raises some interesting constitutional questions. 245 In any case, the basis of the
court's decision should be the behavior of the patient in the treatment facility. Mere conclusions about his expected behavior or his
current lack of "insight" should not justify continued confinement.
If continued commitment is ordered, the findings of fact and conclusions of law must state specifically the behavioral basis for the determination, that the statutory criteria for commitment continue to be
satisfied, the alternatives considered and the reasons they were
rejected.246
If, after the required hearing, the court finds the patient meets
the statutory criteria for continued commitment as mentally ill, the
court must determine the probable length of needed commitment. 247
238. ld., subd. 4.
239. See MINN. STAT. § 2538.08 subd. 1 (1982).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
241. MINN. STAT. § 2538.12 subd. 4 (1982).
242. MINN. STAT. § 2538.13 subd. 2 (1982).
243. ld., subd. 3.
244. See supra note 35 ("mentally retarded") and note 13 ("chemically dependent").
245. See, e.g., Comment, Police Power Commitments, 13 UNIV. ToL. L. REV. 421, 437 n.
85 (1982).
246. MINN. STAT. § 2538.12 subd. 7 (1982).
247. MINN. STAT. § 2538.13 subd. 1 (1982).
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The length of continued commitment cannot exceed the lesser of the
recommended length or twelve months.
The statute is not free from ambiguity, but it appears the maximum total length of commitment for a person mentally ill, including
the initial period of six months, is eighteen months. The statute
states that "[n]o period of commitment shall exceed this length of
time 248 or twelve months, whichever is less."249 The words "no period" may indicate that the total length of commitment is twelve
months. More likely they acknowledge the fact that there are two
periods of commitment; the initial period, limited to six months, and
a continued period limited to twelve months. Further, the twelvemonth limit noted above is allowable after a hearing which may be
held as much as six months following the original order for commitment. Legislative clarification would undoubtedly be useful.
At the expiration of the total eighteen-month period of commitment, only a new petition can cause further commitment. 25o The
same burden and standard of proof as apply at the six-month hearing on continued commitment also apply at the proceeding following the eighteen-month commitment. 251 The length of this
consecutive commitment resulting from a new petition cannot exceed the lesser of twelve months or the probable length of commitment needed. Presumably, at the end of the lesser of twelve months
or the period found probably necessary, the continued commitment
provisions would again apply and another twelve-month period
could be added. Thus, a consecutive commitment could result in up
to twenty-four months of additional confinement before yet another
petition were needed. However, if a time gap exists between the
expiration of a continued commitment and the filing of another petition, the usual provision for a six-month initial commitment period
will apply again.
Indeterminate continued commitment can be ordered if the
court finds, after receiving the six-month treatment report, that a
person continues to be mentally retarded. 252 The Act is unclear as
to the mentally retarded patient's right to a hearing before an order
248. For example, the judicially determined probable length of continued commitment.
249. MINN. STAT. § 2538.13 subd. I (1982).
250. Id. The new petition and determination thereon are governed by the provisions for
the original commitment.
251. Id.
252. MINN. STAT. § 2538. \3 subd. 2 (1982). Note that the definition of "mentally retarded person" requires both below average intellectual abilities and behavioral evidence of
likely harm to self or others. See MINN. STAT. § 2538.02 subd. 14 (1982).
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for indeterminate commitment. On one hand, the provision regarding the duration of the continued commitment suggests that indeterminate commitment of the mentally retarded can occur without a
hearing, since it allows such an order after only a review of the treatment report.253 On the other hand, the provision for review of commitments254 requires a hearing before continued commitment of the
mentally retarded.
Continued commitment for a chemically dependent person can
be ordered after a hearing for up to one year. Again a total of eighteen months is potentially involved. The subdivision states: "[T]he
court shall order the continued commitment of the person for a period of time not to exceed one year."255 Continued commitment requires a finding that the person continues to be chemically
dependent. If commitment beyond this eighteen-month period is
sought, a new petition and hearing will be required. 256 The length
of the initial commitment pursuant to this successive petition is the
lesser of twelve months or the probably necessary time. As in the
case of mentally ill persons,257 only if the commitment periods are
consecutive will the initial period of six months be avoided.
VII.

PROVISIONAL DISCHARGE FOR PERSONS NOT COMMITTED
AS MENTALLY ILL AND DANGEROUS

The Act specifies in considerable detail procedures governing
provisional discharge and revocation of provisional discharge. It
does not, however, explicitly define the term "provisional discharge." In practice, a provisional discharge entails a release from
the hospital or other treatment facility to a less structured setting in
the community. The characteristics of a provisional discharge are
outlined by the substantive provisions of the Act. 258 A provisional
discharge is a discharge of the patient without a discharge of the
commitment. 259 The provisional discharge may entail conditions or
restrictions on the patient, some of which may subsequently serve as
grounds for revoking the provisional discharge. A provisional discharge is often used as an intermediate step between commitment to
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

MINN. STAT.
MINN. STAT.
MINN. STAT.

§ 2538.13 subd. 2 (1982).
§ 2538.12 subd. 4 (1982).
§ 2538.13 subd. 3 (1982) (emphasis added).

Id.
MINN. STAT.
MINN. STAT.

§ 2538.13 subd. 1 (1982).
§ 2538.15 (1982).

Id., subd. l.
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a hospital and full, outright discharge. The procedures for those
committed as mentally ill and dangerous differ from those for persons committed under the other categories and are discussed later in
this article. In both cases, though, the Act calls for notice and opportunity for a hearing concerning the revocation of a provisional
discharge, and sets forth the grounds upon which provisional discharge can be revoked.
F or persons not committed as mentally ill and dangerous, the
new Act, like the old law, provides that the head of the treatment
facility may grant a provisional discharge. 26o The patient must have
an "aftercare plan" which specifies, among other things, the expected length of time for the provisional discharge, and the conditions or restrictions on the patient. The plan must also contain the
conditions upon which the provisional discharge may be revoked.
The provisional discharge terminates, making the discharge absolute, on the date specified in the plan, unless the provisional discharge is extended or revoked. 261 No provisional discharge can
extend beyond the end of the commitment period as set by the
court. 262
Revocation

The Act authorizes the head of the treatment facility to revoke
provisional discharges for two reasons. There must be either a violation of a material condition of the provisional discharge plan
which creates a need to return the patient to the facility, or a serious
likelihood that the safety of the patient or others will be jeopardized. 263 In order to establish the latter ground, conditions similar to
those necessary to support an initial commitment must be shown. 264
The Act takes a middle-ground in defining permissible grounds
for revocation. It does not permit revocation for naked violations of
the provisional discharge plan. Such revocations might result in
people being returned to the hospital who did not medically belong
there. Provisional discharge plans often contain three kinds of conditions. Some are intended to protect the patient or the public from
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Where appropriate, the court could extend the commitment period for a person on
provisional discharge provided that the criteria for continued commitment are met.
263. MINN. STAT. § 2538.15 subd. 2 (1982).
264. Failure to provide food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or an attempt or threat to
seriously harm self or others physically may result in revocation of the provisional discharge. Id.
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harm,265 Other conditions are intended to benefit the patient and
speed his recovery. 266 A third category of conditions might be described as administrative. They are imposed to enable social services agencies to provide service to the provisionally discharged
person, and to monitor the provisional discharge plan. 267 Clearly, a
violation of a condition of the second category might not indicate a
need to return the individual to the treatment facility, while a violation of a condition in the first would cause greater concern. Hospitalization for violation of the secOIid or third type of condition
would be punitive rather than therapeutic. The Act also avoids the
other extreme which is allowing revocation only under the same
conditions as the initial commitment. Making revocation too difficult might cause heads of facilities to be more cautious, thus deterring or delaying releases on provisional discharge.
As mentioned above, the Act conditions revocation upon either
a showing that the criteria similar to those for initial commitment
are met, or upon a showing that the patient has violated the provisional discharge plan, and that the violation creates a need to return
to the facility. The last phrase is not defined. Presumably, a need to
return to the facility would have to be connected to the purpose of
confinement in a facility. As suggested, "punishment" for violating
the provisional discharge plan would not, in these authors' view,
constitute "need" to return to the facility. Likewise, a likelihood of
physical harm need not be shown in order to establish necessity.
Rather, the Act would appear to allow revocation as a means of
intervening at a somewhat earlier stage of a crisis, with the aim of
averting more serious deterioration. 268
Revocation is commenced by the head of the treatment facility
serving a notice of intent to revoke on the patient, his attorney and
the designated agency. Any party, including the designated agency,
may request the head of the facility to revoke. 269 Prior to taking
265. For example, a requirement that the patient take his psychiatric medication, refrain
from using drugs, or refrain from possessing firearms.
266. For example, a requirement that the patient attend recreational sessions at a local
club.
267. The requirement that the patient notify the social service agency of a change in
address.
268. The most common example of this situation might be a provisional discharge plan
which requires the patient to take certain medication. The violation of that provision might
create the need to return the patient to the hospital to restabilize even though the mental
condition has not yet deteriorated to the point where an initial commitment could be
justified.
269. MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 subd. 3 (1982).
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such a step, however, the designated agency must notify the patient
of the possibility of revocation. All possible steps must be taken to
avoid revocation. Such steps would entail attempts to meet the patient's needs without returning him to the treatment facility. For
example, if the need for revocation is evidenced by the patient's failure to provide shelter for himself, the first step in avoiding revocation would be to attempt to provide shelter.
No hearing is held unless the patient or another interested person requests a hearing.27o Upon such a request, the head of the facility must file a petition for review with the committing court.
Alternatively, the patient or other interested person can file the petition for review. The committing court must hold a hearing on the
revocation within fourteen days or within five days of a request for
an immediate hearing. 271 Ifno one requests a review hearing within
fourteen days of service of notice of intent to revoke, the revocation
becomes final and the court may order the patient returned to the
facility without a hearing.
In general, the Act contemplates that notice and hearing, if requested, will precede a return to the facility. However, in an emergency, the court may order the patient returned to the facility prior
to a review hearing. 272 In order to take this extraordinary step, the
court must find that immediate return is necessary in order to avoid
serious, imminent physical harm.
The first sixty days of a provisional discharge are excepted from
the procedural requirements described above. 273 During that time
period, the head of the facility may revoke a provisional discharge
without providing the notice and opportunity for hearing otherwise
required. Although the Act is somewhat unclear as to what grounds
the head of the facility may rely upon to revoke during the sixty-day
period, it appears that the grounds are the same as those applicable
to the remainder of the commitment period. 274 The rationale for
270. Id., subd. 4.
271. Id. The burden of proof at the hearing is on the party seeking revocation. This
might be the designated agency or the treatment facility from which the patient was provisionally discharged.
272. MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 subd. 5 (1982).
273. Id., subd. 6.
274. The Act says the head of the treatment facility may revoke "upon a finding that
either of the conditions set forth in subd. 1 [of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15 (West 1982)]
exists." Subdivision 1 does not set forth two conditions as suggested by this language, although it does refer to the conditions imposed on the patient. Subdivision 2 does set forth
the conditions upon which revocation is normally permitted. These authors believe the reference to subdivision 1 is an error. It is subdivision 2 of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.15 (West
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excepting the first sixty days from the procedural requirements is
that simplifying the procedure for revocation will encourage treatment facilities to be more liberal in granting provisional discharges.
The Act contains provisions governing the extension of provisional discharges. 27s No hearing is provided. The extension of a
provisional discharge cannot extend the commitment beyond the
period designated by the committing court. 276
The Act contains changes which allow a patient on provisional
discharge to return voluntarily to the treatment facility without
causing a revocation of the provisional discharge.277 Under prior
practice, a patient on provisional discharge could return to the facility in only two ways: as an informal patient, or as a committed patient. 278 In the first case, the commitment would be discharged. In
the second, the provisional discharge would be revoked. The head
of the hospital could choose which alternative to offer the patient.
The new law adds a third alternative. The patient can return "temporarily from provisional discharge."279 Under this alternative,
both the commitment and the provisional discharge remain in effect.
The patient would be free to leave the facility at any time as if he
were an informal patient, but remains subject to the provisional discharge plan. This new provision adds a flexible tool which will allow treatment facilities to shape treatment programs more
accurately to meet the individual needs of their patients without an
artificially induced change in legal status. Under prior practice, return to the treatment facility from provisional discharge was problematic because it involved a change in status. The change will be
particularly useful where patients on provisional discharge suffer a
temporary setback which can best be remedied by a short stay in the
hospital. For example, a patient on provisional discharge may have
stopped taking his medications. The treating physician may feel
that patient needs to be hospitalized briefly in order to restabilize
him on the medications. If the patient is willing, there is no need,
under the Act, to revoke the provisional discharge merely to have
the patient in the hospital for a brief period for a discrete purpose.
1982) which should govern the revocation process during the first sixty days of provisional
discharge.
275. MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 subd. 7 (1982).
276. ld., subd. 8.
277. ld., subd. 10.
278. Flick v. Noot, No. 4-78 Civil 359 (D. Minn. 1979). Stipulated agreement dated
April 30, 1979, ~ IV. B., Minn. Dept. Pub. Welfare Policy Bull. 75-37 (1975).
279. MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 subd. IO (1982).
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JUDICIAL RELEASE

The Act retains provisions of the old law allowing a patient to
petition the court for release from commitment. 280 The procedures
remain essentially unchanged, with four exceptions. The new law
makes clear what was implicit in the old, that this petition for release is unavailable to those committed as mentally ill and dangerous.28\ Second, the new law provides that the patient as well as any
interested person may petition for an order that further institutionalization is not required. Under the old law, only "interested persons" could petition and some argued that this term excluded
patients. 282 Third, the new law omits any reference to "restoration
to capacity." The reference in the old law was a vestige of prior law,
under which commitment entailed a finding of legal incompetency.
Finally, the new law provides for the appointment of examiners in
connection with the hearing on the petition for release. Carrying
over the process of the initial commitment hearing, the law provides
that only one examiner need be appointed. A second examiner of
the patient's choosing is to be appointed only upon request. The
burden of proving mental capacity appears to be on the patient. 283

IX.

COMMITMENT AS MENTALLY

ILL

AND DANGEROUS

In general, the initial commitment of a person as mentally ill
and dangerous to the public follows the same procedures as those set
forth for the other disability groups.284 The main differences are
that MI & D commitments may be made indeterminate, while commitments for mentally ill and chemically dependent must be determinate,285 and the discharge and release provisions for MI & Dare
different and more stringent than for the others. 286 These differences are intended to make it more difficult for patients labeled
"dangerous to the public" to obtain release from commitment. By
permitting indeterminate commitments of those committed as MI &
280. Compare MINN. STAT. § 253B.17 (1982) with MINN. STAT. § 253A.15 subd. 2 (1980)
(repealed August I, 1982).
281. See In re K.B.C., 308 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. 1981).
282. MINN. STAT. § 253A.19 subd. I (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
283. See In re Restoration of Masters, 216 Minn. 553,13 N.W.2d 487 (1944); Lausche v.
Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 302 Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974), cerro denied, 420 U.S. 993
(1975).
284. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 (1982).
285. Compare MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 13 (1982) with MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd.
3 (1982).
286. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982).
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D, the Act places the burden on the committed patient to prove that
he is entitled to release. In order to be released, an MI & D patient
must, therefore, convince the fact-finder that he is no longer dangerous. This is an extremely heavy burden, for a number of reasons.
First, the prediction of dangerousness, or a lack thereof, is an inexact science. The burden of this inexactness will fall on the patient
who desires a discharge, rather than on the petitioner who desires to
maintain the commitment. Second, past behavior will be considered
probative of the patient's future behavior. However, generally the
MI & D patient who is seeking a discharge will have been hospitalized for some period of time immediately preceding the consideration of his request for a discharge. The fact that hospitalization
entails structure and supervision will be used to undercut the predictive significance ofa history of non-dangerous behavior while hospitalized. Finally, even the speculative possibility that the patient
might engage in violence may be enough to deter some decisionmakers from certifying that the patient is no longer dangerous.
Such speculation might not, however, be sufficient to sustain a finding that the patient remains dangerous. The net effect of making MI
& D commitment indeterminate is that it is extremely difficult for
patients with this type of commitment to obtain discharges. The difficulty stems from the nature of the patient's burden, which requires
him to prove a negative fact, based upon an inexact science, and a
data base which is of questionable relevance. As a result, some patients who are no longer in fact dangerous may be denied a discharge because they are unable to prove that they will not be
dangerous in the future. The burden is on the petitioner to prove his
case by clear and convincing evidence. 287
The Act suggests, though it does not say so explicitly, that a
commitment as MI & D may be made only upon a petition alleging
that the person is mentally ill and dangerous to the public. The Act
refers to a "petition alleging that a proposed patient is mentally ill
and dangerous to the public," in specifying the procedures to be
used in MI & D cases. 288 Although the Act does not specifically
prohibit a commitment as MI & D without such an explicit pleading, basic principles of due process would require that the proposed
patient have advanced notice of the allegations being made against
him. The Civil Commitment Rules of Procedure support this con287. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. I (1982). This burden is required for the original MI
& 0 commitment, presumably the same standard would be required for release.
288. Id.
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clusion. They require that the petition in a commitment case "specify the disposition sought."289
The commitment must be reviewed at the end of sixty days.29o
On the basis of the review, the court has three options. The person
may be committed as MI & D for an indeterminate period, or as
mentally ill only for a determinate period,291 or discharged from the
commitment. 292 The procedures surrounding the review of the MI
& D commitment following the first sixty-day period are somewhat
unclearly stated in the Act, but are clarified in the Civil Commitment Rules of Procedure. 293
In the authors' view, the legislature intended to require a hearing prior to the indeterminate commitment of a person as mentally
ill and dangerous. This conclusion follows from a close reading of
the language of the Act, and is made explicit in the Civil Commitment Rules of Procedure. 294
The new Act retains the basic framework of the old law relating
to transferring and discharging people committed as' MI & D. 295
The power to make modifications in the commitment is vested in the
Commissioner of Public Welfare, who may act only after receiving a
favorable recommendation from the Special Review Board. 296
The new law provides for time limitations to govern the Special
Review Board's consideration of petitions. Interested parties must
be notified of the date of the Special Review Board hearing within
forty-five days of the filing of the petition. 297 Although the language
of the Act is ambiguous on this point, it seems that this passage intends that the hearing and not merely the notice, must be held
289. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 1.02. The old law contained no such pleading requirement, explicitly or implicitly.
290. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 2 (1982).
291. Governed by MINN. STAT. § 253B.15 (1982) discussed supra at note 259-280.
292. The third alternative, though only implicit in the Act, is explicit in MINN. R. CIV.
COMMITMENT 12.02.
293. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 12.
294. MINN. R. CIV. COMMITMENT 12.01.
295. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 5 (1982) replaces MINN. STAT. § 253A.15 subd. 2
(1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
296. The Act does not specify the membership of the Special Review Board. MINN.
STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 4 (1982). This omission is clearly due to a typographical error, and
will likely be remedied during the next legislature. In the interim, the Commission of Public
Welfare will probably continue the practice, required by prior law, of appointing threemember Special Review Boards. Of these three, one was required to be a physician qualified in the diagnosis of mental illness or mental retardation; one was required to be an
attorney; and no member could have any connection with the Department of Public Welfare. MINN. STAT. § 253A.16 subd. 5 (1980) (repealed August I, 1982).
297. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18 subd. 5 (1982).
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within forty-five days of the filing of the petition. 298 The Commissioner must issue his order within fourteen days of receiving the
Special Review Board's recommendation. The Commissioner's order can be effective no sooner than fifteen days after it is issued. 299
Transfer or Discharge

The Act sets out factors to be considered in determining
whether to transfer or provisionally discharge a patient. In either
case, the Commissioner must find that the action can be accomplished with a "reasonable degree" of safety or protection for the
public. 300 This standard acknowledges the imprecision of predictions of dangerousness. 301 No ironclad guarantee of safety is
required.
The Act sets out three criteria for the discharge of a person
committed as MI & D.302 First, the person must be "capable of
making an acceptable adjustment to open society." Second, the person must be no longer dangerous to the public. Third, it must be
found that the person "is no longer in need of inpatient treatment
and supervision."303 Under the old law, a person could be discharged upon a finding that he could make "an acceptable adjustment in society."304 Under the Act, the person must be able to
adjust to an "open" society. This change was intended to address
the specific problem arising when a person committed as MI & D
has been provisionally discharged to a prison to serve a prison sentence previously imposed. Under the old law, the person could argue that he had made, and would continue to make, an acceptable
adjustment in the society in which he found himself - the prison.
The addition of the term "open" apparently is intended to preclude
this interpretation of the term "society."
In Johnson v. Noot,305 the Supreme Court construed for the first
298. If the 45-day limit applies only to the notice, and not to the hearing, it would provide little if any protection to the patient, because there is no requirement governing the
length of time which may follow the notice prior to a hearing. Since a hearing before the
Special Review Board is a necessary precondition to obtaining release, it would be appropriate to require that the hearing be held promptly upon request.
299. MINN. STAT. § 253A.15 subd. 2(2) (1980) (repealed August I, 1982) provided that
the order could not be effective any sooner than 30 days after entry thereof.
300. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 6, 7, & 15 (1982).
301. See Johnson V. Noot, 323 N.W.2d 724,728 (Minn. 1982).
302. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982).
303. Id.
304. MINN. STAT. § 253A.15 subd. 2(2) (1980) (repealed August 1, 1982).
305. 323 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1982).
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time the language of the old law limiting discharges to those patients
capable of making an acceptable adjustment in society. The Commissioner of Public Welfare argued that he and the Special Review
Board had discretion to determine whether the patient was "dangerous in the ordinary sense of that word, irrespective of the patient's
mental condition."306 The Court rejected that argument, holding
that it was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. The Court
pointed out that the statutory definition of the term "dangerous to
the public" included the elements of mental illness or deficiency.
F or that reason, the Court concluded that a patient who was no
longer mentally ill should be discharged from an MI & D commitment even if he was still dangerous, "[W]e hold that the statutory
criteria for discharge of a person committed as mentally ill and dangerous - that the patient is "capable of making an acceptable adjustment in society" - be construed to mean that the patient is
either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous.,,~o7
The Act adds two criteria to the "acceptable adjustment" standard of the old law. The patient must be "no longer dangerous to
the public" and "no longer in need of inpatient treatment and supervision."308 Neither of these additions should change the Johnson
construction of the "acceptable adjustment" standard. The term
"dangerous to the public" is part of the statutorily defined phrase
"mentally ill and dangerous to the public."309 The definition clearly
requires a causal link between the mental illness and the dangerousness. The requirement of a causal connection is more stringent than
the old law, which was satisfied by the mere coincidence of the
mental condition and dangerous behavior.310 Thus, the new definition of "dangerous to the public" is consistent with the Johnson discharge standard. Finally, the criterion regarding inpatient
treatment and supervision is consistent with Johnson. A patient who
is no longer mentally ill no longer needs to be an "inpatient," and
thus should satisfy this criterion.
In addition to the three criteria mentioned above, the Act requires the Special Review Board and Commissioner to consider
whether conditions exist "to provide a reasonable degree of protec306. Id. at 728.
307. Id.
308. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982).
309. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 17 (1982).
310. Id.
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tion to the public."311 If these conditions do not exist, the discharge
is not to be granted. This provision may be meant to add a fourth
criterion to the three set forth previously in the Act. Alternatively, it
may be intended simply to clarify that the determination regarding
"danger to the public" need not be an absolute one, but may be
measured by the concept of "reasonable" protection. In view of the
Act's insistence on a causal connection between the mental illness
and the dangerousness, it appears that the first alternative should be
rejected. The Act should not be read in a way that would retain
people under commitment who are no longer mentally ill. The second alternative would be consistent with the idea that dangerousness is difficult to predict accurately.312
Unlike the provisional discharge for the other disability
groups,313 provisional discharges for persons committed as MI & D
do not terminate automatically with the passage of time. Rather,
such patients can be discharged only after a hearing by the Special
Review Board. 314
Revocation

of Provisional Discharge

Three grounds for revocation of provisional discharge are set
out. These differ in several respects from the grounds applicable to
non-dangerous committed persons. 315 First the provisional discharge may be revoked if the patient has departed from the conditions of the provisional discharge. 316 There is no explicit
requirement that the departure have created a need for rehospitalization. Thus, it is theoretically possible that a person who has violated a condition of his provisional discharge could end up back in
the hospital without a need to be there. Such a person would, presumably, be immediately ready for provisional discharge, since
there would be no reason to keep him in the hospital. As pointed
out below, the Special Review Board, in reviewing revocations, has
the authority to recommend amendment of provisional discharges.
311. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982).
312. In Johnson the Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized this difficulty "[TJo date, no
valid clinical experience or statistical evidence reliably describes psychological or physical
signs or symptoms that can be reliably used to discriminate between the harmless and the
potentially dangerous individual." 323 N.W.2d at 728.
313. See supra notes 262-63.
314. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. 15 (1982). See also In re K.B.C., 308 N.W.2d 4
(Minn. 1981).
315. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
316. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. IO(i) (1982).
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Such an amendment might be more productive than returning a
person to the hospital who has no need to be there.
Second, it is grounds for revocation if the person is exhibiting
"signs of mental illness which may require in-hospital evaluation or
treatment."317 Third, if the person is exhibiting behavior which
"may be dangerous" to self or others, his provisional discharge may
be revoked. 318
In general, the revocation provisions for MI & D are more permissive than those applicable to the other disability categories.
However, the main thrust of revocations ought to be therapeutic and
protective, not punitive. Thus, provisional discharge conditions
should be carefully framed to attempt to insure that only those conditions which are of material importance in allowing the patient to
live successfully in the community are included. This will avoid returning people to the hospital for violations if they do not need
hospitalization. 319
The head of the treatment facility is authorized to revoke provisional discharges. Except in emergency situations, notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the Special Review Board must
precede the revocation. 320 The patient must be given a copy of a
"revocation report," along with a statement of his rights under the
Act. He then has forty-eight hours to request review. In an emergency,321 the head of the facility can have the patient returned to the
hospital prior to notice. Notice of his rights in connection with a
provisional discharge revocation must be provided to the patient
within seven days of his return to the hospital. Thereafter, review is
obtained as above.
CONCLUSION

Commitment is a legal process not a medical process. It raises
fundamental questions regarding the state and individual rights.
317. fd., subd. \o(ii).
318. fd., subd. 10(iii).

319. For example, while it may be therapeutically sound to suggest that a person on
provisional discharge attend recreational sessions in addition to taking his medications, failure to attend the sessions may not in itself, be indicative of a need for hospitalization. Instead of making recreation a "condition" of the provisional discharge, it might be wiser to
label it a suggestion or recommendation or offer of service.
320. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 subd. \0 (1982).
321. The term "emergency" is not defined at this point in the Act. It would be reasonable to allow re-hospitalization in connection with a provisional discharge revocation under
the same standards as govern the emergency hold prior to a petition. MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.05 subd. I (1982),
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There is no doubt commitment represents a "massive curtailment of
liberty."322 It is sometimes argued in a particular case that a person
needs "the protection of a commitment." This phrasing reveals an
underlying and continuing problem in the field. Because physicians
and psychologists are involved and because the terminology employed speaks of treatment or help for the person, the true nature of
the process is sometimes forgotten. Commitment is viewed by many
as a benevolent process rather than a massive invasion of civil
rights. In the commitment process, the law is frequently perceived
as an impediment to needed help. This perspective fails to recognize the process as a legal one. The decision of when to use the
power of the state to coerce an individual is appropriately made by
the legislature. The commitment law represents the legislative balancing of individual rights and the state interest in protecting its
citizens.
The process accorded persons subject to the commitment laws
is due them. It is not to be seen as merely a roadblock on the path to
better health. If commitment is viewed purely as a way to obtain
help for an ill person the burden will shift and the proposed patient
will, in effect, be forced to prove he does not require treatment. Society has placed the burden on the petitioner; it subverts that decision to view commitments purely as a medical decision.
The new Act provides more due process for those subject to
commitment. It represents the legislative decision regarding the
price society will pay for mental health and individual rights.

322. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
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